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ABSTRACT
Task, Christine Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. Privacy-preserving Social Network Analysis. Major Professor: Chris Clifton.
Data privacy in social networks is a growing concern that threatens to limit access
to important information contained in these data structures. Analysis of the graph
structure of social networks can provide valuable information for revenue generation
and social science research, but unfortunately, ensuring this analysis does not violate
individual privacy is diﬃcult. Simply removing obvious identiﬁers from graphs or even
releasing only aggregate results of analysis may not provide suﬃcient protection. Differential privacy is an alternative privacy model, popular in data-mining over tabular
data, that uses noise to obscure individuals’ contributions to aggregate results and
oﬀers a strong mathematical guarantee that individuals’ presence in the data-set is
hidden. Analyses that were previously vulnerable to identiﬁcation of individuals and
extraction of private data may be safely released under diﬀerential-privacy guarantees. However, existing adaptations of diﬀerential privacy to social network analysis
are often complex and have considerable impact on the utility of the results, making
it less likely that they will see widespread adoption in the social network analysis
world. In fact, social scientists still often use the weakest form of privacy protection,
simple anonymization, in their social network analysis publications, [1–6].
We review the existing work in graph-privatization, including the two existing
standards for adapting diﬀerential privacy to network data. We then propose
contributor-privacy and partition-privacy, novel standards for diﬀerential privacy over
network data, and introduce simple, powerful private algorithms using these standards for common network analysis techniques that were infeasible to privatize under
previous diﬀerential privacy standards. We also ensure that privatized social net-

xi
work analysis does not violate the level of rigor required in social science research, by
proposing a method of determining statistical signiﬁcance for paired samples under
diﬀerential privacy using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, which is appropriate for
non-normally distributed data.
Finally, we return to formally consider the case where diﬀerential privacy is not
applied to data. Naive, deterministic approaches to privacy protection, including
anonymization and aggregation of data, are often used in real world practice. Deanonymization research demonstrates that some naive approaches to privacy are
highly vulnerable to reidentiﬁcation attacks, and none of these approaches oﬀer the
robust guarantee of diﬀerential privacy. However, we propose that these methods fall
across a range of protection: Some are better than others. In cases where adding noise
to data is especially problematic, or acceptance and adoption of diﬀerential privacy
is especially slow, it is critical to have a formal understanding of the alternatives.
We deﬁne De Facto Privacy, a metric for comparing the relative privacy protection
provided by deterministic approaches.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous value in the set of relationships among individuals, which touches
on many important areas of scientiﬁc inquiry. Social networks are powerful abstractions of this information, applying a classical graph data-structure representing individuals as nodes and their relationships as edges. Social network analysis can yield
valuable insights into the behavior of populations. For example, understanding how
well-connected a network is can aid in the development of a word-of-mouth marketing
campaign: How quickly will word of a product spread? Similar analysis is useful in
epidemiology (predicting spread of a disease through connections in a population), or
in learning analytics (studying how students’ interactions impact learning).
However, data about people and their relationships is potentially sensitive and
must be treated with care to preserve privacy. Generally, social network graphs are
anonymized before being made available for analysis. For example, Figure 1.1 depicts
one of the earliest applications of social network analysis to anthropological research;
the beginnings of a schism in a university karate club was detected before the group
decided to split in two, through surveying members about their social interactions.
The graph was published as a simply anonymized network with node labels indicating
subsequent group membership and leadership roles [7].
Unfortunately, releasing anonymized graphs may lead to re-identiﬁcation of individuals within the network and disclosure of conﬁdential information, with serious
consequences for those involved. In the karate club network, anyone possessing minimal background knowledge of the group would be able to assign names to the two
leader nodes (nodes 1 and 34). Other nodes are distinctive as well: we know from
details in the publication that 2,3 and 33 are likely to be the teaching assistants in
each group, and we know that 9 was the only student to associate closely with leader
A but remain in the group with leader B. A small amount of familiarity with the

2

Fig. 1.1.: An anonyzmized social network collected over the 34 members of a university
karate club, shortly before a schism caused the group to split in two.

club would be suﬃcient to assign names to these nodes. Once one distinctive student
has been identiﬁed in the graph, background knowledge about that student will help
us uncover other students. For example, if we knew that Alice was the only student
who split oﬀ after being friends with the leader of the original group, then we know
Alice is node 32. Say we know that Bob is friends with both the leader of the new
group and TA 3 in the old group, and we’ve also heard that he has one partner he
practices with privately. Then Bob must be 29 and Alice, node 32, is his previously
private partner. The process of mapping true names to anonymized individual data
entries, in this case graph nodes, is known as ’de-anonymization’. In a de-anonymized
data-set, sensitive information such as private relationship edges, node degrees, and
node or edge properties is made fully public.
Fortunately, the karate club study was published in 1977; the club did not have
a website, and the students were not on Twitter. This limited the public availability
of background information that could be used to identify individuals in the network.
To the best of our knowledge, the karate club network has not been de-anonymized.

3
By contrast, in 2007 Netﬂix released the ’Netﬂix Prize’ data-set containing
anonymized data about the viewing habits of its members, intended for public analysis by information retrieval researchers. Within a year, it had been demonstrated
that wide-spread de-anonymization of individuals in the data-set was possible using publicly available background information from the Internet Movie Database [8].
By 2009, Netﬂix was involved in a lawsuit with one of its members who had been
victimized by the resulting privacy invasion.
This object lesson about the dangers of publishing simply-anonymized data in
the internet-era appears to not have been well-learned. In March of 2014, the Public Library of Science (PLOS), a major publisher of research in the biological and
medical sciences, mandated that researchers make their data fully, publicly available
as a condition for publication [9]. PLOS publications include researchers working on
sensitive epidemiology social networks [10,11]. Restrictions are permitted only in the
case of sensitive human data, but anonymized data has in the past been considered
to be suﬃciently protected. In the learning analytics community, researchers still
commonly include complete anonymized networks of students in their published papers, in a continuation of the practice applied in the 1977 karate club paper [1–6].
These networks may include sensitive node data such as course grades, discussion of
academic diﬃculties, and private relationships between students. Meanwhile, public
outcry about the privacy risks of educational data-analysis in K-12 schools threatens
to entirely prevent the adoption of these techniques, despite evidence that they have
potential to signiﬁcantly improve students chances of success [12–14].
My work directly addresses the problem of creating eﬀective, usable privatized
social network analysis tools.
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1.1

Challenges in Graph Privatization
Satisfying this need is non-trivial.
The strength of de-anonymization techniques: Privacy researchers have at-

tempted to improve the security provided by graph anonymization techniques by
adding noise to the node parameters and structure of the graph [15]. However,
even a noisy graph structure with no node parameters whatsoever can be subject
to deanonymization, particularly if an attacker has background knowledge of the network data [16,17]. Knowing the friendship relationships of a few individuals can make
them identiﬁable in the released graph, leading to identiﬁcation of their friends (and
disclosure of information, such as other relationships, that those friends might not
want publicly revealed). As global social networks become more broadly accessible,
sources of extensive background knowledge are increasingly available [16].
The complexities of Diﬀerential Privacy: Diﬀerential privacy is a privacy
standard developed for use on tabular data that provides strong guarantees of privacy
without making assumptions about an attacker’s background knowledge [18]. Diﬀerentially private queries inject randomized noise into query results to hide the impact
of adding or removing an arbitrary individual from the data-set. Thus, an attacker
with an arbitrarily high level of background knowledge cannot, with a high degree of
probability, glean any new knowledge about individuals from diﬀerentially privatized
results; in fact, the attacker cannot guess whether any given individual is present in
the data at all.
While many of the privacy concerns associated with social-network analysis could
be relieved by applying diﬀerential privacy guarantees to common social network
analysis techniques, researchers have struggled to develop suitable adaptations of
these techniques.
Two principal diﬃculties arise: The adaptation of diﬀerential privacy from tabular
data to network data, and the high sensitivity of social-network metrics to relatively
small changes in the network structure. This high sensitivity requires many existing
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diﬀerentially private network analysis techniques to add impractically large amounts
of noise when operated on real world data, signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the utility of the
privatized results [19].
The diﬃculties in real world adoption: Privacy protection is not a hypothetical concern for individuals appearing in social science and data-mining data-sets. Privatization techniques that are very mathematically or algorithmically complex may
be less likely to be adopted by the members of the social science community who are
collecting and studying human data [19–21]. Although this research may provide insightful theoretical solutions to the privacy problems they address, in the real world,
those privacy problems remain.

1.2

Problem Statement
In this work, we will consider the question: ”Is practically usable, privacy-preserving

social network analysis feasible?” We will address this question in three ways:
• We will propose and demonstrate network privatization techniques that adapt
diﬀerential privacy to satisfy these requirements for many social network analysis applications, including the computation of statistical signiﬁcance on paired
samples under diﬀerential privacy.
• We will also demonstrate that some types of analysis are inherently diﬃcult to
privatize.
• We will ﬁnally propose a metric for formally comparing the relative privacy
protection provided by deterministic approaches, such as anonymity and aggregation, which have the advantage of not introducing noise to the data, but
which fall short of satisfying the robust guarantee of diﬀerential privacy and are
more vulnerable to attack.
A fundamental contribution of this dissertation is the following observation: In
privacy-preserving contexts, it is vital to consider the intended application of the
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sensitive data and to use a data structure which requires no more complexity or detail than absolutely required to successfully achieve the intended objective. In social
network applications the objective is to learn about the population abstracted by the
network, and the network data-structure itself can be an optional intermediate step in
the analysis process. Protecting privacy in a single complete, cohesive network is very
challenging: building the network requires tying together information from thousands
of individuals into a tightly interlinked whole in which any suﬃciently pathological
small change might dramatically aﬀect global analysis results, and privatization essentially involves very carefully destroying that same network.
By introducing analyses that do not require a single cohesive network, but rather
consider distributions of unlinked ego-network or sub-graph data, we can oﬀer comparable strengths of privacy protection without going through the expensive steps
of ﬁrst constructing and then privatizing the complete social network graph. We
demonstrate that it is possible to preserve, with high accuracy, the aggregate social
patterns we actually seek to study while using sets of unlinked, relatively insensitive
and naturally privacy-preserving data.

1.3

Contributions
Our ﬁrst set of contributions involve identifying eﬀective methods of adapting

diﬀerential privacy to network data. Previous to our work, two models for applying
diﬀerential privacy to social networks have arisen. Node-privacy limits the ability of
an attacker to learn any information about an individual, but at a high cost in added
noise. Edge-privacy protects against learning any particular relationship, but does not
prevent learning information about an individual. This work introduces contributorprivacy and partition-privacy, models for diﬀerential privacy that can provide stronger
protection for individuals than edge privacy while allowing important types of analysis
that are not feasible under node privacy.
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Additionally, we propose De Facto Privacy as a metric for objectively comparing
the privacy provided by deterministic approaches, such as simple anonymity and
aggregation, that fall short of satisfying diﬀerential privacy.
Speciﬁcally, this work provides:
1. A straightforward introduction to traditional diﬀerential privacy and the basics
of social network analysis (Chapter 2);
2. A discussion of existing work in graph-privatization, including work on anonymity,
de-anonymization, and the two existing diﬀerential-privacy standards for network data (Chapter 3).
3. The contribution of two new standards, contributor-privacy and partition-privacy,
that provide strong privacy guarantees with the introduction of very small noise.
(Chapters 4,5).
4. The contribution of new, easily implementable, algorithms satisfying contributorprivacy that use ego-network style analysis to provide useful approximate results
for queries that are too sensitive to perform under previous standards.(Chapter
4).
5. The contribution of easily-implementable algorithms applying partition-privacy
to a variety of contexts; These techniques provide strong privacy guarantees for
analyses which learn correlations from sets of graphs (for example, identifying
patterns of behavior in student collaboration groups). (Chapter 5)
6. Application of these techniques to real world data, including online social networks. (Chapters 4,5).
7. A diﬀerentially private approach to determining statistical signiﬁcance on pairedsample data, using the Wilcoxon Signed-rank Test (which is appropriate for
non-normally distributed social network data). (Chapter 6).
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8. The proposal of De Facto Privacy, a formal measure of the relative protection
provided by deterministic approaches, which do not satisfy diﬀerential privacy.
(Chapter 7)
In the next two chapters we will cover necessary background information and
provide a survey of existing research in privatized social network analysis. In chapters
4-5 we will introduce and demonstrate new privacy-preserving algorithms for many
social network applications. In chapter 6 we will propose a diﬀerentially private
method for computing statistical signiﬁcance on paired-sample data. And in chapter
7 we will deﬁne De Facto Privacy.
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2. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we provide a basic introduction to the two areas of research which
are spanned by this dissertation. We explain the concept of diﬀerential privacy and
describe how it has been applied to tabular data and network data, and we review core
analysis techniques in social network analysis that will be referenced in the remainder
of this work.

2.1

Introduction to Diﬀerential Privacy
Diﬀerential privacy, developed by Cynthia Dwork and her collaborators at Mi-

crosoft Research [22], states a mathematical guarantee of privacy that suﬃciently
well-privatized queries can satisfy; it is independent of any speciﬁc technique or algorithm. Consider a common sequence of events in social science research: a survey
is distributed to individuals within a population; a subset of the population chooses
to participate in the survey; individual information from the surveys is compiled into
a data-set and some analysis is computed over it; the analysis may be privatized
by the injection of random noise; and the ﬁnal privatized result is released to the
general public. Diﬀerentially-private queries oﬀer a rigorous mathematical guarantee
to survey participants that the released results will not reveal the nature of their
participation in the survey.
We ﬁrst introduce a few useful notations: I is set of individuals who contribute
information to the data-set DI (e.g., survey participants). The set of all possible
data-sets is D. We use F : D → k : to refer to the desired non-privatized analysis
performed on a data-set and Q : (D) → k to refer to the non-deterministic privatized
implementation of F . Given a speciﬁc data-set DI , evaluating the non-deterministic
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function Q(DI ) produces a result R ∈ k which has been privatized for general
publication.
If R is the privatized query results that are released to the public, then R is the
only evidence an attacker has about the nature of DI . We introduce a possibleworlds model to understand how diﬀerential privacy works. We deﬁne DI to be true
world from which the analysis was taken. Two closely related variant deﬁnitions of
diﬀerential privacy are in common use:
In the ﬁrst variant deﬁnition (see Figure 2.1), we deﬁne any data-set that diﬀers
by the presence or absence of one individual to be a “neighboring” possible world:
thus DI−Alice is the neighboring possible world of DI in which Alice chose to not
participate in the survey and DI+F ran is the neighboring possible world of DI in
which F ran chose to participate in the survey.

Fig. 2.1.: Diﬀerential privacy adds noise to obfuscate individuals’ eﬀect on query
results. In the ﬁrst deﬁnition variant, an individual’s presence in the data is hidden.

In the second variant (see Figure 2.2), we deﬁne a neighboring possible world to
be any data-set that diﬀers in the value of one individual: If in DI Bob reports that
he is Sad, then DI(Bob→Happy) is the neighboring possible world of DI in which Bob
responded to the survey by stating that he was Happy. One signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between these variants relates to the number of individuals in the data-set: In the
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ﬁrst variant the number changes between neighboring worlds while in the second
variant it is ﬁxed.

Fig. 2.2.: Diﬀerential privacy adds noise to obfuscate individuals’ eﬀect on query
results. In the second deﬁnition variant, an individual’s value in the data is hidden.

In this work, we will most often make use of the ﬁrst variant deﬁnition–it is
the most commonly applied deﬁnition in existing privatized social network analysis
research. This may be true in part because altering the ’value’ of an individual in
a network is not intuitively well-deﬁned. If removing all of an individual’s edges is
an allowable alteration, the two variants are in fact equivalent for analyses such as
triangle counts (section 2.3.2). Additionally, because it hides participation in the
data-set entirely, the ﬁrst variant is more applicable to sensitive social networks (such
as sexual interaction networks) in which presence in the data-set itself is sensitive.
To satisfy diﬀerential privacy, we require that an attacker possessing the privatized
results R be unable to determine with high certainty, between any two neighboring
worlds, which world is the true one; R should be a plausible result from any neighboring world of DI . With reference to the ﬁrst variant deﬁnition, this intuitively
implies the attacker is unable to use the privatized published survey results to guess
with high probability whether or not Alice (or any other speciﬁc individual) took the
survey, i.e., whether or not R is the result from an analysis of DI or DI−Alice . In the
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second variant, the attacker may be able to use the results to determine that Bob has
taken survey, but he is prevented from learning whether Bob is happy or depressed
(whether the true world is DI or DI(Bob→Happy) ).
Formally, we deﬁne Diﬀerential Privacy as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1 Neighboring World:
Variant I: Two data-sets DI1 , DI2 are neighbors if they diﬀer by the addition
or removal of exactly one individual: |I1 ∪ I2 − I1 ∩ I2| = 1
Variant II: Two data-sets DI1 , DI2 are neighbors if they diﬀer in data provided
by exactly one individual: iﬀ I2 = (I1 − i) + j for arbitrary individuals i,j.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Diﬀerential Privacy: A randomized query
Q : D → k
satisﬁes -Diﬀerential Privacy [18] if, for any two possible neighboring data-sets
D1 , D2 and any possible set of query results R ∈ k :
P r[Q(D1 ) ⊆ R]
≤ e
P r[Q(D2 ) ⊆ R]
Here  is a small, positive value that controls the trade-oﬀ between privacy and
accuracy, and is chosen by the person administering the privacy policy. To make the
deﬁnition more intuitive, consider that if we set  = ln(2) , the above states that the
result R is at most twice as likely to be produced by the true world as by any of its
neighbors. Setting a smaller  will provide greater privacy at the cost of additional
noise, as we will demonstrate below.
The diﬀerence between the results from D1 and any neighbor D2 is the diﬀerence
the privatization noise will need to obfuscate in order for the privatized results to
not give evidence about whether D1 or D2 is likely to be the true world. The upper
bound of this diﬀerence over DI ∈ D is the sensitivity of query F .
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Deﬁnition 2.3 Global Sensitivity: The global sensitivity of a function F :
D → Rk = A is 1 :
ΔF = max F (D1 ) − F (D2 )
D1 ,D2

1

over all pairs of neighboring data-sets D1 , D2 .
Intuitively, the sensitivity of a query is the greatest possible separation between
two neighboring worlds with respect to the query results. Under the ﬁrst variant
deﬁnition, this is the greatest possible impact that adding or removing an arbitrary
individual from the data-set can have on the query results, over any possible data-set.
Suppose our analysis F asks two questions: “How many people in I are failing?” and
“How many people in I have fewer than 3 friends?” Then both answers can change by
at most 1 when a single individual is added to or removed from I, and ΔF = 2. If our
analysis instead asks: “How many people in I are failing?” and “How many people
in I are passing?” then at most one answer can change by at most 1, and ΔF = 1.
Note that, under this variant, histograms which partition the individuals of the data
set into ”bucket” counts have a sensitivity of 1: removing or adding an individual
will change at most one bucket count by at most 1. This very low sensitivity makes
histograms a useful tool in diﬀerentially private data-mining [22–24].
Note that under the second variant deﬁnition neighboring worlds are separated by
changing one individual’s value rather than their presence in the dataset, and this can
result in diﬀerent evaluations of function sensitivities. Consider Figure 2.2: Although
the query here is a histogram, partitioning the students into mutually exclusive Happy
and Depressed counts, altering one individual’s value aﬀects two counts by at most
one, and this results in a slightly higher sensitivity of 2 in this case.
For the remainder of this work we will use the ﬁrst variant deﬁnition; exceptions
will be speciﬁcally noted.
We can create a diﬀerentially private query Q by adding noise to F that is calibrated to cover up ΔF [22]:
1

The L1 -norm of x ∈ n is deﬁned as x

1

= Σni=1 |xi |.
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Theorem 2.4 If F : D → k is a k − ary function with sensitivity ΔF then the
function R = F (D) + Lapk (ΔF/) is -diﬀerentially private, where Lapk (λ) is a ktuple of values sampled from a Laplacian random variable with standard deviation
√
2λ.
The standard deviation of the Laplacian noise values is

√

2ΔF/. Thus the noise

will be large if the function is very sensitive, or if  is small. If we set  = ln(2) on
a query with sensitivity ΔF = 2, the standard deviation of our added noise will be
close to 4.
It is important to note that ΔF is an upper bound taken across all possible pairs
of neighboring data-sets; it is independent of the true world. Intuitively, this is necessary because noise values which are dependent on the nature of the true world may
introduce a privacy leak themselves. For example, when querying the diameter of a
social network, if Alice forms the only bridge between otherwise unconnected subgraphs in the true world, removing her node and edges from the data-set causes a
diﬀerence of ∞ in the graph diameter. Noise values calibrated to this true world must
be arbitrarily large (and, in fact, will obliterate the utility of the result). However,
consider a neighboring possible world including Bob, who forms a second bridge between the subgraphs (see Figure 2.7); if this possible world were the true world, the
diﬀerence in diameter caused by adding or removing a node would be ﬁnite, and if
we calibrated the noise to that diﬀerence, it would be relatively small. If we chose
our noise values based on the true world, an attacker could easily determine whether
or not Bob was in the network: a result of R = 300, 453.23 would imply Bob was
absent, while the result R = 4.23 would indicate that Bob was present. To prevent
this, global sensitivity is based on the worst-case scenario for the query, across all
possible data-sets. In this example, this implies that diameter is a query too sensitive
to be feasibly privatized using traditional diﬀerential privacy.
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2.1.1

Smooth Sensitivity

Several sophisticated privatization techniques exist that calibrate noise to the true
data-set, avoiding the worst-case upper-bound oﬀered by global sensitivity. Consider
an actual data-set DJune12 ; the local sensitivity of a function F on the data DJune12 is
the maximum change in F caused by removing or adding an individual from DJune12 ,
analogous to computing the global sensitivity with D1 , D2 restricted to DJune12 and
its neighboring possible worlds. In the example above, diameter(Gbob )’s local sensitivity is small, while the local sensitivity of its neighbor diameter(Galice ) is very high:
this jump in local sensitivities is what causes the threat to privacy described above.
Since Galice is created by removing one individual from Gbob , we will refer to Galice as a
one-step neighbor of Gbob , and consider a k-step neighbor of Gbob to be one created by
adding or removing k individuals from Gbob . Smooth sensitivity is a technique which
computes privatization noise based on both the local sensitivity of the true data-set,
and the local sensitivity of all k-step neighbors scaled inversely by k, for all k [25].
The technique ‘smooths’ over the local-sensitivity jumps depicted in the alice-bob
graph example. However, local-sensitivity based techniques satisfy a slightly weaker
deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy: (, δ)-indistinguishability. Privatization strategies
which satisfy (, δ)-indistinguishability produce results R ∈ k which satisfy a modiﬁed version of Deﬁnition 2.2 that includes an additive term:

P r[Q(D1 )⊆R]
P r[Q(D2 )⊆R]

≤ e + δ,

where δ is a negligible function of the data-set size n 2 . Additionally, in some cases
computing the amount of noise required to privatize a given DI may be infeasible.
We will primarily focus on techniques which satisfy strict -diﬀerential privacy in this
work, but we will reference existing smooth-sensitivity techniques where applicable,
and we recommend consulting [26] for more information on this approach.
2

A third variant, (, δ)-diﬀerential privacy, allows a constant value δ
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2.2

Diﬀerential Privacy and Network Data
The deﬁnitions we introduced above for diﬀerential privacy, Deﬁnitions 2.1 and

2.2, implicitly assume all information about a data-set participant is provided by the
participant themselves; protecting an individual’s presence or submitted data value in
the data-set then protects all the information regarding them. The situation changes
when we ask survey participants to provide information about other individuals.

Fig. 2.3.: Unlike tabular data, participants in social network studies provide information about each other. This information may be incomplete or inconsistent.

We will refer to individuals who contribute their knowledge to the data-set as
participants, and individuals who have information provided about themselves (by
others) as subjects. Traditional diﬀerential privacy protects participants only, and
in many cases subject privacy may be unnecessary. To clarify, we return to our
view of a dataset as a survey of the real world: if a survey counts the students who
attended the “Coﬀee with the Dean” event, the dean’s privacy is probably not an
issue. By contrast, a study that counts students who report having sexual relations
with the football captain exposes extremely sensitive information about its subject.
Social networks are often collected from populations of interest by having participants
list the full names of their friends within the population; these relationships form
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directed network edges leading from the participant’s node to the nodes of each of
her friends [27]. In this case, a participant’s real world friends are subjects of the
participant’s ”survey data”, but the participant herself may also be the subject of
some of her friends’ survey data (if they also participate in the social network). This
presents a complex situation for applying diﬀerential privacy. Figure 2.3 illustrates
an example.
The core of the diﬀerential privacy guarantee is that the privatized result R is
diﬃcult to attribute to the true world vs. one of its neighboring possible worlds.
Adapting diﬀerential privacy to networked data amounts to deciding what we mean
by “neighboring worlds” in this context. There are several possibilities; each one
provides a diﬀerent level of privacy guarantee and deals with a diﬀerent type of “gap”
between worlds. As always, there is a trade-oﬀ between privacy and utility: in general,
the stronger the privacy guarantee, the more noise will be required to achieve it and
the less useful the privatized results will be. We will describe two network privacy
standards, node-privacy and edge-privacy, that have appeared in the literature.
In subsequent chapters, we will propose two novel standards, contributor-privacy
and partition-privacy, that require less noise than existing standards; give a reasonably strong guarantee of privacy similar to traditional diﬀerential privacy; and enable
certain queries that under existing standards required levels of noise that rendered
results meaningless.

2.2.1

Node-Privacy

The Alice-Bob graph example referenced in Section 2.1.1 and Figure 2.7 implicitly
assumes this privacy standard: In node privacy, if the true world is a given social
network G, the neighboring possible worlds are ones in which an arbitrary node, and
all edges connected to it, are removed from or added to G. Formally,
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Deﬁnition 2.5 Node-Privacy: A privatized query Q satisﬁes node-privacy if it
satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy for all pairs of graphs G1 = (V1 , E1 ), G2 = (V2 , E2 ) where
V2 = V1 − x and E2 = E1 − {(v1 , v2 )|v1 = x ∨ v2 = x} for some x ∈ V1
Note the two equivalent interpretations of this deﬁnition: G1 is equal to G2 after
the addition of an arbitrary x, or G2 is equal to G1 after the removal of an arbitrary
x.
This privacy guarantee completely protects all individuals, both participants and
subjects. An attacker in possession of R will not be able to determine whether a
person x appears in the population at all. Although this is an natural adaptation of
diﬀerential privacy to social networks, it also places extremely severe restrictions on
the queries we are able to compute, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 3, in many
cases, node-privacy may be an unnecessarily strong guarantee. Figure 2.4 depicts
neighboring worlds in a triangle-count (see Section 2.3.2) under node-privacy.

Fig. 2.4.: Node-sensitivity of triangle-counts is a function of n, and thus is unbounded
in general.

2.2.2

Edge-Privacy

In edge-privacy, if the true world is the social network G, neighboring possible
worlds are ones in which k arbitrary edges are added or removed from G. Formally,
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Deﬁnition 2.6 Edge-Privacy:
A privatized query Q satisﬁes edge-privacy if it satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy for
all pairs of graphs G1 = (V1 , E1 ), G2 = (V2 , E2 ) where V1 = V2 and E2 = E1 − Ex
where |Ex | = k
An attacker in possession of R won’t be able to determine with high certainty
whether individuals x and y are friends, and an individual node in the graph can
plausibly deny the existence of up to k of its friendships with other nodes. Single
edge privacy, with k = 1, is the standard most often used in existing literature on
diﬀerentially private graph analysis. This is a weaker guarantee than node-privacy:
high-degree nodes may still have an easily identiﬁable eﬀect on query results, even
though their individual relationships are protected. However, this is a suﬃciently
strong privacy guarantee for many contexts, and enables many more types of queries
to be privatized than the severely-restrictive node-privacy. Figure 2.5 depicts neighboring worlds in a degree distribution (see Section 2.3.2) under edge-privacy.

Fig. 2.5.: Edge sensitivity of degree distribution queries is 4: at most four values can
change by one when a node is added or removed.

2.3

Social Network Analysis Background

2.3.1

Introduction

In this section we will review the social network analysis techniques which will be
discussed in the remainder of this work. While we focus primarily on those network
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analysis techniques that have so far proven at least partially amenable to privatization,
we will also brieﬂy sketch the properties of network data that deter the privatization of
other types of analyses. Intuitively, privatizable network characteristics are those that
tend to remain approximately consistent under small changes in the network data;
these are the same characteristics that are robust to small errors in data-collection.
Social networks oﬀer a useful abstract model of individuals (represented as graph
nodes) and the relationships that connect them (represented as edges between nodes).
Social network analysis can be a very important tool, allowing researchers to learn
about populations by identifying meaningful patterns in their social networks. For
example, understanding how well-connected a network is can aid in the development
of word-of-mouth marketing campaign: How quickly will word of a product spread?
Similar analysis is useful in epidemiology, predicting spread of a disease, or in learning
analytics, studying how students interact and collaborate. One of the earliest social
networks used in CS research is given in Figure 2.6, originally published in 1977 [7].

Fig. 2.6.: An anonyzmized social network collected over the 34 members of a university
karate club, shortly before a schism caused the group to split in two.
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2.3.2

Social Network Analysis Review

We now provide a high level introduction to common terminology and techniques
in Social Network Analysis. We divide the ﬁeld into six broad categories, with respect
to objective and types of computation: Edges and Degrees, Triangle and Subgraph
Counts, Centrality and Path-length Measures, Community Detection, and Graph
Models. For each topic we will deﬁne basic terminology, outline common analysis
techniques, and discuss any challenges to privatization. We will reference these categories throughout the remainder of this work.
It is important to note that social network analysis studies human behavior
through abstract data-structures which encode real word social structures. Objectives include learning about the relative social importance of individuals in the network, how information propagates through a population, and how individuals form
into communities. For each objective, there are a variety of possible analysis techniques; due to the ambiguity inherent in human social behavior, there is often no
single deﬁnitive correct result or best analysis technique. We review a selection of the
most commonly-used techniques below.

Edges and Degrees
The degree of a node is the number of edges connecting to it, in a social network
this often represents the number of friends the individual has in the network. If a
graph is directed, edges may be uni-directional arrows pointing from one node to
another (for example, if Amy lists Bob as a friend, but Bob does not return the favor,
the edge will appear in the graph as an arrow leading from Amy to Bob). An edge
leading out from a node is referred to as an outlink, and an edge leading into a node
is an inlink; a mutual edge is undirected and can be counted as both an outlink
and an inlink. The count of a node’s outlinks is its out-degree (in-degree is deﬁned
analogously). In directed graphs, reciprocity metrics measure the extent to which
the edges in the graph tend to be mutual [28]. We see that the karate club graph is
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undirected, and that nodes 1 and 34 have high degree. The edge density of a graph
is the total number of edges divided by the total number of nodes; this is also referred
to as the average degree.
In some graphs, edges are labeled with numbers that indicate the relative ’strength’
of the edge connection (for example: the number of emails exchanged between the
node individuals); these labels are referred to as the weight of the edge. Edges may
also be labeled with relationship properties: In a signed graph, positively labeled
edges may be used to represent friendships while negatively labeled edges represent
enemies. Nodes can be labeled with properties of the individual they represent, such
as gender, career status, or course grade. In graphs with node labels, homophily
metrics measure the extent to which nodes that share label values tend to be connected, relative to nodes that do not share label values [29].
A node i’s neighborhood is the subgraph whose nodes consist of i and i’s friends,
and whose edges consist of all edges that connect these nodes. For example, in
the karate club graph, the neighborhood of node 17 has nodes: 17,6,7, and edges:
(17,7),(17,6),(7,6). This is also sometimes referred to as a node’s ego − network.
The degree distribution of a graph is a histogram partitioning the nodes in the
graph by their degree; it is often used to describe the underlying structure of social
networks for purposes of developing graph models and making similarity comparisons
between graphs [30]. Intuitively, a graph with a few very high degree nodes and very
many low degree nodes will describe a more hierarchical social organization than a
graph with a more egalitarian degree distribution (although almost all large social
networks possess a power-law degree distribution).

Triangle Counts and Subgraph Counts
Triangles, instances in which two of an individual’s friends are themselves mutual
friends, indicate social cohesion in the network. Global triangle counts, a count of
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all the triangles in the network, are often used to study and compare networks and
as parameters in social network models.
Additionally, we can look at patterns with triangles on the local level. An individual’s local clustering co-eﬃcient is the ratio between the number of triangles
the node participates in and the maximum possible number of triangles for a node of
that degree [31]. A clique is a graph, or sub-graph, in which all possible edges exist;
in a friendship graph, this implies all nodes in the set are friends with all other nodes
in the set. The local clustering coeﬃcient for individuals in a clique is 1, provided
there are no edges connecting to individuals outside the clique. Distributions of local
clustering coeﬃcients across the network (analogous to degree distributions) can give
more detailed information for comparing networks [32].
Finally, counts of other subgraphs such as stars, or squares, are also used as graph
statistics for graph similarity comparisons between networks [33].

Centrality and Path-length measures
A path is a sequence of edges connecting two nodes; for example a path between
node 27 and node 24 in the karate graph in ﬁgure 2.6 is the one comprised of the
two edges (27, 30) and (30, 24). The length of a path is the number of edges
comprising that path (e.g., the length of the given path between nodes 27 and 24 is
2). The shortest path between two nodes is the path between them with minimal
length (e.g., the given path between nodes 27 and 24 is the shortest path between
them). The distance between two nodes is the length of the shortest path connecting
them, so the distance between node 27 and 24 is 2.
Centrality measures attempt to gauge the relative “importance” of speciﬁc individuals within the social network; they may be studied on a per-node basis, identifying
inﬂuential members of the community, or as distribution scores providing information about the overall behavior of the social network [34]. In the karate club network
(Figure 2.6), the individuals represented by nodes 1 and 34 had high importance in
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Fig. 2.7.: Removing one node or edge from a graph can change path lengths catastrophically.

the social group the graph abstracts; They were the leaders of two karate clubs that
formed after the schism. The simplest centrality measure is node degree: nodes with
high degree are more likely to be inﬂuential in the network, (note that nodes 1 and
34 have high degree). However, other centrality measures take into account more
detailed information from across the network: betweenness scores individuals by
the number of shortest-paths between other pairs of nodes across the network that
pass through them, and closeness scores nodes by the sum of their distances to all
other nodes in the graph.
The two more complex centrality measures, betweenness and centrality, present
diﬃculties for traditional approaches to privacy in social networks. Clearly, it is impossible to release a named list of inﬂuential individuals under anonymity or diﬀerential node-privacy. But even distributions of centrality scores can be very sensitive,
under both diﬀerential node- and edge-privacy, due to the role of bridges in the
graph. Removing a node, or edge, that forms the only connection between two otherwise disconnected subgraphs will have a catastrophic aﬀect on path distances in the
network, causing ﬁnite distances to become inﬁnite, and this will drastically alter betweenness and closeness scores (see Figure 2.7). Privatization methods that delete or
add edges to privatize network structure, such as noisy anonymity and k-anonymity
(introduced in the next chapter), may inadvertently add or delete bridges. In general,
privatizing traditional centrality measures, or any metric that relies signiﬁcantly on
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path lengths, remains a very diﬃcult problem for privacy. However, special cases
exist; we propose practical solutions for several such cases in Chapter 5.

Community Detection
People form social groups naturally, and this is reﬂected in social networks as
clumps of nodes which are more densely connected to each other than to the outside
network. We refer to these as social communities. For instance, the karate club
network has two distinct social communities; these communities later actually separated into two clubs. There are a variety of methods for identifying communities in a
network [35]. Two simpler approaches are: Modularity-based techniques, which involve identifying a subset of nodes that are more strongly attached to each other than
to the outside graph, and the Girvan-Newman algorithm, which splits graphs into
communities by removing bridge nodes (nodes with high betweenness) that connect
them. More complex techniques consider the eigenvalues of the connection matrix for
a network. Community detection is a diﬃcult problem for privatization, similar to the
diﬃculties found in centrality and path-length analyses (recall that the betweenness
of a node may vary catastrophically with the addition or removal of another node or
edge). However, recent work has made progress here under edge-privacy; we present
an overview of these approaches in Chapter 3.

Graph models
Graph models attempt to abstract the underlying social interaction patterns
that produce networks in populations [36]. In general, a graph model takes in parameters that describe a real network (such as the network’s degree distribution, average
degree, or triangle count), and then can be used produce a randomized synthetic
graph that shares these properties. Models enable formal analysis of network properties by providing a simple, well-deﬁned abstraction which allows for drafting and
proving hypotheses about network properties. They are also useful for producing
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privacy-preserving synthetic data-sets which share similar properties to the real, sensitive data-sets. In theory, these privatized synthetic networks may be safely shared
and studied in place of the real data; in practice, they may lose important properties
from the original graph, such as clustering patterns. Many diﬀerent graph models
exist, each with advantages and disadvantages. A variety of diﬀerentially private
models have been proposed by privacy researchers; we’ll discuss these in Chapter 3.
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3. RELATED WORK
As the ﬁeld of social network analysis has advanced in the decades since the publication of the Karate Club graph, the problem of privacy-preserving social network
analysis has received increased attention. A diverse variety of techniques have been
proposed. We summarize these techniques in chronological order, corresponding to
the development of increasingly rigorous privacy guarantees.
We believe that several properties are important for a privatization technique to
be practically usable in real world contexts:
• Guaranteed Privacy: It must provide a well-deﬁned privacy guarantee to
individuals in the data-set.
• Maintain Utility: It must enable privatized analyses to produce results with
a reasonable level of accuracy.
• Practically Adoptable: To encourage adoption it must not impose a significant burden in computing power or mathematical expertise in comparison to
the non-privatized analysis it replaces.
Many of the existing proposed techniques satisfy one or two of these requirements,
but fail to satisfy all three.

3.1

Simple Anonymity and De-anonymization
Initial attempts to protect the privacy of individuals in social network studies

used simple anonymization, as in the Karate Club graph (ﬁgure 2.6). This remains a
common standard in practice in social science research today [1–6]. However, simple
anonymity is subject to de-anonymization attacks when an attacker has access to
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outside information about a population. For instance, knowing how many friends an
individual has may be suﬃcient to identify their node in a small anonymized graph.
Once a few individuals have been re-identiﬁed, some friends of these individuals may
become identiﬁable, and the de-anonymization proceeds by the same means out across
the graph. Public online social networks (OSN) such as Twitter, IMDB, and Pinterest
help attackers get access to the outside information necessary for these attacks. When
the correct names have been mapped to the nodes in an anonymized graph, any
privacy protection the publisher hoped to provide is invalidated. Attackers may
discover sensitive information in node-labels (such as weight, grade, or disease status),
in edge-labels, and in the existence of previously unknown relationship edges between
individuals (problematic in sensitive data-sets such as sexual relationship networks).
In larger graphs, identifying small unique subgraphs in the anonymized graph is
suﬃcient to begin the de-anonymization procedure [16].
A simple step to address this vulnerability is to add ’noise’ to the graph structure:
randomly add and delete edges and nodes in the anonymized graph to obfuscate the
true graph structure [37]. However, the eﬀect of this noise is often insuﬃcient to
hide unique structures in the graph. De-anonymization techniques are suﬃciently
powerful to attack very large real world graphs, even in the presence of structural
noise and some sophisticated structural anonymization techniques [16, 17, 38]. Massive de-anonymization attacks have been executed on the Netﬂix data-set and an
anonymized Twitter graph, uncovering the actual individuals associated with the
anonymous data (with signiﬁcant negative consequences in the Netﬂix case). Simulated de-anonymization attacks have also been demonstrated on the Enron Email
and Facebook data-sets, using synthetic user IDs [8, 16, 17, 38].

3.2

K-anonymity and Related Approaches
De-anonymization attacks demonstrate that individuals with unique social struc-

tures are vulnerable in simply anonymized networks, and may remain vulnerable even
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after random noise is added to the graph structure. K-anonymity is an approach to
privatization, developed by Latanya Sweeney, that restricts the presence of unique
individuals in published data-sets [39]:
Deﬁnition 3.1 K-Anonymity: A set of records V with attributes A satisﬁes kanonymity if for every tuple v ∈ V there exist at least k1 other tuples vi1 , vi2 , ..., vi(k-1) ∈
V such that ∀Aq ∈ A:
vi1 .Aq = vi2 .Aq = ... = vi(k-1) .Aq
where Aq ∈ A is a quasi-identifying attribute.
K-anonymity relies on the data-publisher to decide which attributes of the data
are sensitive (quasi-identifying) and might be used to re-identify individuals. In tabular data, personal information attributes such as zip code or date of birth are often
considered to be quasi-identifying. There are a variety of interpretations for what comprises a sensitive attribute in a social network. In general, greater levels of anonymity
protection require more complex algorithms to achieve and have a greater impact on
the utility of the data.
Researchers have looked at k-degree anonymity, ensuring that no node had a
unique degree that could be used to identify it [40]. However, if an attacker had additional information about an individual’s friends, she might still be able to identify him
by his unique neighborhood graph. Researchers proposed k-neighborhood anonymity
to address this, ensuring that no node had a unique neighborhood

1

graph [41].

Neither of these approaches would guarantee protection if the attacker had possession of a larger subgraph, such as two friends with a unique pair of degrees, or a
set of several connected neighborhoods which formed a unique subgraph. Thus, even
stronger forms of k-anonymity have been proposed. K-automorphism and k-confusion
anonymity both ensure that each node is indistinguishable from at least k others (in
terms of edges), for an arbitrarily sized subgraph: for example, consider a set of k
1

Recall from Chapter 2 that an individual’s neighborhood is comprised by the individual’s node, its
friends (’neighbors’), and all edges that connect these nodes.
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leaf nodes connected to the same central node, or a clique of size k. These approaches
require extremely complex algorithms to achieve and the resulting privatized graphs
do not necessarily share many features with the original data [20, 42].
Additionally, the k-anonymity approach to privatization has a few well-known
faults which also apply in the social network analysis context. Consider a graph
tracing the spread of an STD. If an attacker knows that Carl has degree 18, and
every node of degree 18 is labeled as having been infected with syphilis, the fact
that there are at least k nodes of degree 18 in the graph does not provide Carl with
meaningful privacy protection.
One approach that has been proposed to address this weakness is l-diversity [43].
L-diversity requires that each sensitive attribute category also has a diverse set of data
values: at least l diﬀerent values must be ”well-represented” for each equivalence class
of quasi-identifying attributes. However, l-diversity further decreases the utility of the
analysis by altering the distribution of the data. Additionally, the privatization algorithm may leave a recognizable mark on the data, which can allow the privatization
steps to be undone. Consider an attacker who is aware that a graph has been released
with privacy parameters k = 12, l = 2, and representation-threshold = 3, requiring
that each quasi-identifying category contain at least 12 individuals and both the values ”syphalitic” and ”healthy” must be represented in the category at least three
times. If the attacker then observes that in the category of degree-18 nodes there are
precisely 9 syphilitic and 3 healthy nodes, she may be able to infer the original true
data values. [15].

3.3

Diﬀerential Privacy
Diﬀerential privacy oﬀers a formal guarantee of individual participant’s privacy

that is not conditional on the attacker’s background knowledge. As we described in
chapter 2, there are two existing standards of diﬀerential privacy on social networks:
edge privacy and node privacy. In edge privacy, neighboring worlds vary by one
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relationship; in node-privacy they vary by one node and all of its edges. In general,
edge-privacy provides a relatively weak privacy guarantee, while the much stronger
node privacy is hard to attain without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting utility.
Recall that, in contrast to anonymity methods, which attempt to privatize raw
data-sets, diﬀerential privacy generally focuses on either privatizing the output of
functions over data or producing entirely synthetic data-sets. In the following sections
we will demonstrate how node-privacy and edge-privacy apply to our categories of
social network applications (as described in Chapter 2), and discuss what has been
accomplished so far in each category. In the subsequent two chapters we will introduce
our own adaptations of diﬀerential privacy to social network data, which we refer to as
contributor-privacy and partition-privacy, and we will discuss how these adaptations
resolve several of the diﬃculties with node-privacy and edge-privacy that are described
below.

3.3.1

Triangle Counting

Node-Privacy

Fig. 3.1.: Node-sensitivity of triangle-counts is a function of n, and thus is unbounded
in general.

Diﬀerentially private triangle counts are not feasible under simple node-privacy.
In the worst case, adding a node to a complete graph of size n (a graph containing
 
all possible edges), will introduce n2 new triangles (Figure 3.1). Since the change is
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dependent on the size of the graph, the global sensitivity of the query in general is
unbounded: it is impossible to compute a ﬁnite global upper-bound (see Section 2.2).
To address this issue, another approach has been proposed [19], using ideas similar
to the smooth sensitivity approach described in section 2.1.1. If it is publicly known
that the maximum degree of a graph is d, then removing or adding a node can

aﬀect the triangle count by at most d2 . Furthermore, any graph whose maximum
degree is greater than d will have a k-step neighbor, for some k, whose maximum
degree will be d (i.e., high-degree nodes can be removed until the maximum degree
of the graph falls within the threshold). On generally sparse graphs with few nodes
above degree d, the number of triangles in this bounded-degree neighbor graph will
be a close approximation of the correct answer. The operation of ﬁnding the lowdegree neighbor incurs its own sensitivity cost, but privacy can be still achieved at
a sensitivity cost in the range O(d2 ) [19]. While this is untenable for large social
networks, networks with low maximum degrees may successfully apply node-privacy
to their triangle counts using this method.

Edge-Privacy

Fig. 3.2.: Edge-sensitivity of triangle-counts is a function of n, and thus is unbounded
in general.
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For similar reasons to node privacy, edge privacy is also not feasible for trianglecounts. In the worst case, removing an edge from a graph with n nodes can remove
n − 2 triangles (Figure 3.2). Since the sensitivity is a function of the graph size, it is
unbounded in general.
However, the local sensitivity of this query under edge-privacy, the sensitivity
over a speciﬁc data-set, is bounded (even when the maximum degree is unbounded).
Consider two nodes, a and b, that have k wedges (paths of length 2) connecting
them, as in ﬁgure 3.2. If G is a graph in which no pair of nodes has more than k
wedges connecting them, then adding an edge to G will create at most k triangles,
and removing an edge will delete at most k triangles. We can apply smooth sensitivity
techniques to take advantage of this in cases where k is not large, and thus attain the
somewhat weaker (, δ)-indistinguishable edge-privacy (see Section 2.1.1). However,
real-world social networks are transitive (if two people share a mutual friend, they’re
much more likely to be friends with each other) which can cause large values of k in
practical applications of this technique. When k is large, even instance-based noise
addition may introduce error of a factor of 10 or greater in analysis results [25].
The global clustering coeﬃcient, which has the practical eﬀect of normalizing the
global triangle count using information taken from the degree distribution, can also
be privatized with a careful application of smooth-sensitivity edge-private techniques.
In this context, the eﬀect of the noise is reduced [44].

3.3.2

Additional Approaches

In Chapter 5 we introduce partition-privacy, which considers social network analysis applications that operate on a set of graphs. Shen et. al. consider a related
context in mining frequent small graph patterns over graph databases, such as those
used in bio-informatics applications. They adapt a tabular-based frequent item-set
approach to the problem, which incidentally satisﬁes partition-privacy [45].
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3.3.3

Degree Distribution

Node-Privacy

Fig. 3.3.: Node sensitivity of degree distribution queries is a function of n, and thus
is unbounded in general.

Although degree distributions are represented as histograms, the sensitivity is not
small under node-privacy because one node aﬀects multiple counts in the distribution:
removing a node from the graph reduces the degree of all nodes connected to it. A
node with k edges can aﬀect a total of 2k + 1 values of the distribution (Figure 3.3).
In the worst case, adding a node of maximal degree will change 2n + 1 values, and
since this sensitivity is dependent on n, it will be unbounded in general (see Section
2.2).

Edge-Privacy
Edge-privacy is feasible for degree distributions. Removing one edge from the
graph changes the degree of two nodes, and aﬀects at most four counts (Figure 3.4).
Under k-edge-privacy, the sensitivity is 4k. With a suﬃciently large graph, this is
a negligible amount of noise, and the utility of this technique has been successfully
demonstrated [24]. Recent work has improved results by considering the set of feasible
degree sequences (ones which can be produced by graphs, without self-loops or multiedges) and post-processing privatized results to fall within this set [46].
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Fig. 3.4.: Edge sensitivity of degree distribution queries is 4: at most four values can
change by one when a node is added or removed.

3.3.4

Centrality and Path-length Measures

Social network analyses such as centrality, clustering and path-length measures,
which can be drastically aﬀected by the existence of bridges in the data, are very
challenging to privatize (as described in the previous chapter). Beyond the novel
contributor and partition-privacy techniques we introduce in subsequent chapters,
little existing work addresses the privatization needs of these analyses.

3.3.5

Community Detection

By contrast, progress has been made with attaining edge-privacy in the eigenvalues
of the matrix representation for a graph. Spectral clustering methods use a graph’s
eigenvalues to identify dense clusters of nodes and edges in the graph. Recent work
has allowed researchers to privately publish edge-private approximations of graphs
that preserve clustering structure [21, 47].

3.3.6

Graph Modeling and Social Recommendations

Several researchers have proposed diﬀerentially private approaches to creating
graph models: randomized synthetic graphs that are generated to be similar to a true,
private, social network and thus can be studied safely in place of the original graph.
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The Stochastic Kronecker graph model has been privatized under edge-privacy [48],
as have exponential random graphs [49]. Several other groups have developed their
own models that satisfy diﬀerential edge-privacy [50–53].

3.4

Summary
Returning to our initial three desired properties for privacy-preserving network

analysis techniques, we note that although considerable research has been done in
this topic in recent years, there still remains room for improvement:
Guaranteed Privacy: Anonymity approaches (including simple anonymity and
k-anonymity) do not provide any broad guarantee of individual privacy which is not
conditional on attacker’s background information. Diﬀerential edge-privacy provides
a broad guarantee for a limited amount of individual information (protecting any one
relationship edge), while diﬀerential node-privacy provides a very strong guarantee
of individual privacy (protecting all information regarding an individual’s attribute
values or relationships in the network).
Maintain Utility: Simple anonymity, some approaches to k-degree anonymity,
and some applications of diﬀerential edge-private analysis produce high-utility results
(in which added noise is non-existent, or has little practical impact on privatized results). By contrast, more advanced k-anonymity techniques (such as k-confusion),
diﬀerential node-privacy, and high-sensitivity edge-private analyses may produce results with low utility (in which added noise or altered data causes privatized results
to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from non-privatized data).
Practically Adoptable: Simple anonymity and some approaches to k-degree
anonymity are both easily explained and easily implemented by data analysts with
limited expertise in privacy. By contrast, more advanced k-anonymity techniques
(such as k-confusion) and many diﬀerential privacy techniques require complex implementations and may not be eﬃciently computable.
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In summary, there is a need for easily implemented analysis techniques which both
provide high utility and satisfy robust privacy guarantees. In subsequent chapters we
will introduce a variety of techniques which address this need.
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4. CONTRIBUTOR PRIVACY
We now introduce a new application of diﬀerential privacy to network data, contributorprivacy, which provides a privacy guarantee very similar to the guarantee given to
individuals in tabular data. Contributor-private algorithms use ego-network style
analysis (focusing on nodes and their immediate neighbors [54]) to provide useful
approximate results for queries that are too sensitive to perform under the previous
diﬀerential privacy standards, node-privacy and edge-privacy.
Recall from Chapter 2 that we refer to individuals whose knowledge is contributed
to the data-set as survey participants, and individuals who have information provided
about themselves (by participants who have knowledge of them) as subjects. Diﬀerential privacy on tabular data guarantees survey participants that the privatized results
will give very little evidence about whether they participated or not. Contributorprivacy oﬀers the same guarantee to participants in network data.

4.1

Deﬁnition
Deﬁne P oI to be the Population of Interest, and C ⊆ P oI to be the set of people

who contribute information to the data-set (the survey participants). Recall that an
ego-network is the vertex-induced subgraph of a node’s neighborhood; it consists of
the node, the node’s direct friendships/friends, as well as the relationships among
those friends.
For i ∈ C, deﬁne di = (Inf o(Egoi ), Inf o(i)) to be the information contributed
by individual i to the data-set. This will include information about themselves,
Inf o(i), and about others within their ego-network Inf o(Egoi ). Note that while
Egoi ⊆ P oI, it is not necessarily true that Egoi ⊆ C. We use D = {di |i ∈ C} =
{Inf o(Egoi ), Inf o(i)|i ∈ C} to refer to the set of di comprising the data-set.
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Deﬁnition 4.1 Contributor-Privacy: A privatized query
Q : D → k
satisﬁes Contributor-Privacy if, for all R ⊆ range(Q), and all pairs of data-sets
D1 = {Inf o(Egoi ), Inf o(i)|i ∈ C1 }, and D2 = {Inf o(Egoi ), Inf o(i)|i ∈ C2 } where
C1 = C2 /i, for some i ∈ C1 :
P r[Q(D1 ) ∈ R]
≤ e
P r[Q(D2 ) ∈ R]
This privacy guarantee protects the data contributed by data-set participants,
using a standard conceptually similar to the deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy over
tabular data. If the true world is a social network G and the survey asks each
individual i to list their gender (their node label, Inf o(i)) and who they believe
is their friend (their outlinks, Inf o(Egoi )), then the neighboring possible worlds
are ones in which an arbitrary node and all of the information it contributed to
the network (its node label and its outlinks) are removed from or added to G. An
attacker in possession of the privatized results R won’t be able to determine whether
a person i supplied their data (submitted a survey) to help produce the graph. This
privacy guarantee is strictly weaker than node privacy, but compares well with single
edge privacy for many queries. Any participant can plausibly deny its out-links, or,
equivalently, any participant can plausibly deny one in-link from another participant
node. Analogous to k-edge-privacy, we can also provide k-contributor-privacy by
considering neighboring worlds that diﬀer from the true world by the informationcontribution of up to k members of the graph. With the di above, 2-contributorprivacy allows two nodes to simultaneously deny all out-links, and as a result, this
enables a complete mutual edge to be protected (providing single-edge privacy in
addition to out-link privacy). In general, a k-level privacy guarantee can be satisﬁed
by scaling the added noise by k.
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However, contributor-privacy can also be generalized to cases in which di includes
information beyond a simple list of i’s perceived friends; any information that i
can contribute to help us learn about P oI can be collected and privatized under
contributor-privacy. We provide several practical examples below.

4.1.1

Privacy Analysis

Contributor-privacy guarantees that a participant submitting their survey to the
data-set will have this contribution obfuscated in the results of any privatized query.
However, in the context of network data, individuals customarily provide information about other individuals as well as themselves. If an edge or a node in a graph
is well-known, what level of protection is oﬀered by contributor-privacy? As described in Chapter 2: traditional diﬀerential privacy does not protect subjects, nodeprivacy does protect subjects, and edge-privacy oﬀers very limited protection to subjects. In this section we will brieﬂy discuss the protection oﬀered to subjects by
contributor-privacy, ﬁrst examining the extremes of contributor-privacy protection
and then brieﬂy outlining an important factor in the general case. For a detailed
understanding of subject privacy, we note that the obfuscation provided to subject
data in noisy contributor-private algorithms is strictly greater than the obfuscation
provided by deterministic algorithms that publish true data values. In Chapter 7, we
will propose and demonstrate a metric for measuring the relative privacy provided by
deterministic data analysis algorithms.
In the worst case, contributor-privacy may provide very little protection to an extremely well-known piece of network data. For example, a population of high school
students is likely to be well-informed about a relationship edge between the school’s
head cheerleader and the football team captain. Surveying these students about the
existence of this edge, and then adding to the result laplacian noise with parameter
(1/), will produce a publishable result which satisﬁes contributor-privacy. This result protects the survey-takers, allowing any student to deny having reported on the
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relationship. However, as the magnitude of noise added will likely be much smaller
than the number of students surveyed, the result will provide very little privacy protection for the two star athletes who serve as the survey’s subjects. In this worst case,
we might argue that this relationship information was already in the public sphere
before the survey was conducted; privacy protection for the subjects would be of little
value. However, publicly publishing this data will allow the information to be shared
beyond the scope of the original population, where it may be less well-known. This
presents an ethical issue that must be considered in any data-mining context: privatized data-mining allows aggregate facts about populations to be published while
protecting individual data, but if the aggregate facts themselves are considered sensitive (for example: rates of drug-use in a particular university dorm, or rates of AIDS
infection within a small neighborhood), then the data-mining results should not be
published.
In the best case, contributor-privacy will provide strong protection for subject
data that is not well known. In our previous example of a high school student population, we might posit a secret tryst between the indicated persons, which they alone
report. In this case, contributor-privacy is eﬀective at subject protection. In fact,
analyses which satisfy 2-contributor-privacy will completely protect this edge in the
data (standard 1-contributor private analyses will provide subject protection with
parameter subject = 2participant ).
The above covers two extreme cases, in which a subject data element is either
completely private or publicly known. To understand the general case, we consider
the eﬀect of an attacker’s level of certainty about the true data-set. Contributorprivacy represents social network data as collected from individuals in a population
by means of a survey, a realistic scenario for many social science applications. When
survey data are collected in this fashion, it’s likely that the data will not form a single
consistent social network. There will likely be people in the population who do not
submit a survey; there may be disagreement about the existence of edges (see Figure
4.1).
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Fig. 4.1.: Unlike tabular data, participants in social network studies provide information about each other. This information may be incomplete or inconsistent.

Incomplete or inconsistent data may not negatively eﬀect analysis utility. As we
demonstrate below, a monolithic, consistent social network isn’t requisite for useful analyses such as degree distributions or local clustering-coeﬃcient distributions.
In fact, imposing mutual friendship edges may produce a less accurate view of the
network; some relationships are simply ambiguous or one-sided.
Additionally, this inherent ambiguity is an advantage for providing subject privacy.
Consider ’subject data’ to be nodes, edges or other information about the network
which may be reported in survey participants’ contributed information. Given a dataset and a speciﬁc set of subject data,ds , we can examine the eﬀects of the presence or
absence of this data on the analysis results. Analogous to local function sensitivity,
we deﬁne this impact as follows:
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Deﬁnition 4.2 Subject Data Sensitivity (δF (ds )): Given a deterministic (nonprivatized) function F : D → Rk = A, and a set of subject data ds , the Subject
Data Sensitivity of F (ds ) is 1 :
δF (ds ) = max F (D1 ) − F (D2 )
D1 ,D2

1

over all pairs of neighboring data-sets D1 , D2 such that D1 = D2 /ds .
Because noise added to protect contributor data does not satisfy any explicit
protection guarantee for subject data, we consider, as a lower bound on subject
privacy, the context in which raw analysis results are published without the addition
of any privatization noise. In Chapter 7 we introduce De Facto Privacy, which provides
a formal metric for analyzing the degree to which a deterministic data analysis and
publication scheme magniﬁes the impact of an attacker’s uncertainty about the data.
Below we provide a brief illustrative example of the fundamental concept.
When the results are published, δF (ds ) is the only information the results provide
an attacker about the existence of ds in the network. However, due to the choice of
publication schemes, the ambiguity in the collected survey data, and the attacker’s
own potential uncertainty about the collected network, the existence of ds may not
the only possible explanation for the eﬀect δF (ds ).
Consider a survey question: ”How many people in the Purdue CS Department are
you friends with?” Summing the data collected from this and dividing by two gives
us an estimate of the number of friendships in the department, where one-sided edges
and edges leading to non-surveyed individuals will be counted as half-edges. Deﬁne
edge-count(G) = |E|/2.
Consider the friendship between Prof. Alice and Prof. Bob, ds = edge(A, B).
If both individuals submit surveys and report on this friendship in their tally, they
will collectively increase the total count by 2, ie δF (ds ) = |edge-count(G) − edgecount(G/ds )| = 2.
1

The L1 -norm of x ∈ n is deﬁned as x

1

= Σni=1 |xi |.
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However, if instead Alice and Bob were each friends with two outside individuals
(Diane and Ed) who did not submit surveys, this would also increase the total count
by 2. Note that |{edge(A, D) + edge(A, E) + edge(B, D) + edge(B, E)}|/2 = 2 =
δF (ds ), thus edge-count(G) = edge-count(G + {D, E}/ds ).
Additionally, if non-participating individual Carla had remembered to submit
her survey counting her four friends Alice, Bob, Fran and George (who had already submitted their surveys), that would also increase the total count by 2. Thus,
|{edge(C, A) + edge(C, B) + edge(C, F ) + edge(C, G)}|/2 = 2.
By itself, δF (ds ) does nothing to indicate which of the many possible explanations
is correct, thus oﬀering some protection for the privacy of the subject data. Intuitively,
the diﬃculty of ruling out alternate explanations, as described above, will cause
analyses that possess low subject-sensitivity and are performed over large data-sets
to impose a signiﬁcant burden on an attacker attempting to use background knowledge
to target a speciﬁc individual. A formal exploration of these concepts will be presented
in Chapter 7 of this work.
Finally, we include a theoretical result regarding the identiﬁability of the network
as whole. Given a analysis set A with total sensitivity ΔA, we note the following
implication of the deﬁnition of contributor-privacy.
Theorem 4.3 If R is the complete contributor-privatized results of analysis set A
over true graph G, then there exists at least two networks G1 , G2 such that G1 = G2
and

P rob[A(G1 )=R]
P rob[A(G2 )=R]

≤ e2 . Thus, an attacker cannot use R to determine with certainty

the true original graph G.

Proof: WLOG, we will assume that G1 is the true original graph. We create G2
by adding one ’leaf ’ node l which has a single edge connecting it to another, arbitrary,
node a in G1 . Because l has only one neighbor, this new (l, a) edge is observed in the
ego-networks of only two nodes: l and a. 1-Contributor-privacy protects data that is
contributed by one node, ensuring that regardless of the analysis being performed, the
guarantee in Deﬁnition 4.1 will hold. We want to protect the information contributed
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by two nodes, (2-contributor-privacy), which would cover the existence of the edge
(l, a).
Consider an intermediate data structure G1−2 which contains a’s observation of
l but does not contain l’s ego-net information (possibly because l did not participate
in the data-set themselves). Then we have that, under contributor-privacy, G1 is a
1-step neighboring world of G1−2 and G1−2 is a 1-step neighboring world of G2 . So,
for any R, we have:

P rob[A(G1 )=R]
P rob[A(G1−2 )=R]

≤ e and

P rob[A(G1−2 )=R]
P rob[A(G2 )=R]

≤ e .

Thus:
P rob[A(G1 )=R]
1−2 )=R]
× PProb[A(G
P rob[A(G1−2 )=R]
rob[A(G2 )=R]
P rob[A(G1 )=R]
≤ e2
P rob[A(G2 )=R]

≤ (e )2

Note that because the choice of a was arbitrary, there will be many possible instantiations of graph G2 , and thus for any given published privatized analysis set R there
will be a (possibly quite large) pool of possible original networks G.
Subject sensitivity is dependent on the choice of analysis, but the above protection, which is based on amounts of contributed information, holds regardless of the
analysis set. In general under contributor-privacy, network features which fall within
many individual’s ego-networks (and thus are directly observable by many individuals) may be visible in the privatized results, depending on the choice of analysis.
Thus, as with edge-privacy, the overall eﬀect of high-degree nodes in the network
may not be protected. However, less observed nodes are guaranteed more protection,
and choosing analyses with lower subject-sensitivity will provide better protection
for higher-degree nodes (we will discuss De Facto protection in Chapter 7). In the
remainder of this chapter, we will demonstrate a number of contexts and analyses
for which contributor-privacy protection is appropriate. For more sensitive contexts,
partition-privacy (if applicable) can provide very strong protection while still enabling
high-utility analysis. Partition-privacy is introduced in Chapter 5.
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4.2

Basic Algorithms
In this section we will present several easy-to-use algorithmic tools that can enable

social network researchers to learn about populations while guaranteeing contributorprivacy. In the next section we will demonstrate the practical application of contributorprivate analysis on a diverse set of real world social network data-sets.

4.2.1

Subgraph Counts

Fig. 4.2.: The triangle distribution allows us to present clustering information with
an contributor-sensitivity of 1.

We propose a method for privatizing information about triangle counts and clustering coeﬃcients under contributor-privacy, using a modiﬁed version of the query
that more closely mimics the information gathered from a social network survey.
To do this, we introduce a simple, powerful method that can be applied to gather
privatized estimates of a variety of useful statistics over nodes in the graph.
By focusing on protecting the knowledge each individual has about their role with
respect to the network, contributor-privacy ﬁts naturally with the techniques of egonetwork analysis, an approach to social network analysis that considers the network
as viewed by the individuals belonging to it [54]. In ego-network analysis, a network
with n members is broken into n overlapping ego-network subgraphs, each consisting
of a individual ‘ego’ node and his or her immediate neighborhood of friends (referred
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to as alters). Algorithm 1 presents survey collecting information about the triangles
in an individual’s ego-network.
Algorithm 1 A survey gathering information about triangles.
function TriangleQuery
f riendlist ← Query(“Who are your friends?”)
f riendpairs ← CrossProduct(f riendlist, f riendlist)
outdegree ← Size(f riendlist)
triangles ← Query(“Which of these pairs are friends with each other?”,
f riendpairs)
trianglecount ← Size(triangles)
return (outdegree, trianglecount)
end function

The only data that is retained by the researcher is, for each individual x: outdegree(x), the number of friends the individual has, and trianglecount(x), the number of triangles the individual participates in. These statistics are suﬃcient to determine the local clustering co-eﬃcient of the node: the ratio between the number of
triangles the node participates in and the maximum possible number of triangles for
a node of that degree [31].
Out-degree and local clustering data from this survey can be collected into a twodimensional histogram that provides detailed information about the patterns of social
cohesion of the graph and has a very low sensitivity under contributor-privacy (see
Figure 4.2): removing or adding an individual’s survey data to the histogram only
alters one partition count by at most one, and thus the noise required to privatize
this data-structure would be very small. Histograms with fewer partitions and larger
count values in each partition are less sensitive to added noise; we propose Algorithm
2 that produces a very ﬂexible, robust, and safely privatized representation of the
social cohesion patterns in the network using local triangle counts.
Algorithm 2 takes as input two node-degree threshold values, deglow , degmed and
uses these to partition the (outdegree, trianglecount) data-points collected from the
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Algorithm 2 Privatizing local clustering coeﬃcient distribution data.
function PrivateClustering(deglow , degmed , data)
Initialize(bins[][])
for all (nodeDegree, triangleCount) ∈ data do
degBin ←Partition(nodeDegree, deglow , degmed )
localCluster ← triangleCount/(nodeDegree ∗ (nodeDegree − 1))
triBin ←Partition(localCluster, 1/3, 2/3)
bin[degBin][triBin] ← bin[degBin][triBin] + 1
end for
for i = 0 → 2, j = 0 → 2 do
bins[i][j] ← bins[i][j]+ LaplacianNoise(1)
end for
return bins
end function
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T riangleQuery survey into low, medium and high degree nodes. The algorithm then
computes the local clustering coeﬃcient of each node and further partitions nodes by
these values, creating a histogram with nine partitions (see Figure 4.2). Laplacian
noise suﬃcient to cover a function sensitivity of 1 is added to each partition, and
the privatized result may be released. We can consider the eﬀect of this noise in
terms of how many of the noisy, privatized partition counts can be expected to diﬀer
measurably from their true values. With only nine counts and a sensitivity of 1, the
expected number of privatized partition counts that will diﬀer from their true values
by more than 3 is less than 0.25. The released histogram accurately captures useful
information about the distribution of local patterns across the graph.
The same approach can be used to collect and privatize any information available
within an ego-network by restructuring the survey as needed. For example, replacing
question 2 in Algorithm 1 by the question “For each of your friends, add a check mark
if the two of you share at least one additional, mutual friend” will collect information
about the probability that an edge participates in a triangle. The question “Are you
part of a group of at least k friends who are all mutual friends with each other?”
collects statistics about cliques in the graph.

4.2.2

Degree Distribution

Fig. 4.3.: Contributor sensitivity = 1. Protecting the out-edges of a node provides
privacy with relatively little eﬀect on the degree distribution.
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Although edge-privacy requires comparatively little noise to protect individuals in
degree-distribution analyses (see Figure 3.4), contributor-privacy requires even less
noise. Here, we consider just the distribution of out-degrees, the result of asking
participants, “How many friends do you have?” Removing one node and its out-links
from the graph aﬀects only one value in the degree distribution (Figure 4.3). Under contributor-privacy, a high-degree node may still leave evidence of its presence
in the data-set through the out-degrees of its friends. However, this may not significantly compromise subject privacy. The set of possible explanations for a slightly
higher-than-expected degree among nodes in the graph is large: they may represent
additional friendships among the nodes, or outside friendships with individuals who
were non-participants in the survey. Exploiting this vulnerability to guess the presence of a high-degree node with any certainty would require an attacker to possess
extensive information about the true social network and survey participation. We
will explore this concept in more detail in Chapter 7.

4.2.3

Edge Properties

We now propose a method for collecting privatized information about a class of
network statistics that can be characterized as propositions on network edges. Assume
we are given a node n with edge-set En = {(n, a)|a ∈ neighborhood(n)}, node labels nl
and {al |a ∈ neighborhood(n)}, and edge labels {el |e ∈ En }. Within this framework,
we can deﬁne propositions that capture useful information about individual edges.
Edge Propositions (e ∈ En )
• Mutual(e): Pmutual ((n, b)) = [(b, n) ∈ Eb ]
• MutSigned(e): Pmutsigned ((n, b)) = [((b, n) ∈ Eb ) and sign(n, b) = sign(b, n)]
• Friend-Type(e): For example, PF emale (n, b) = [F emale?(b)]
• Same-Type(e): Psame−type (n, b) = [nl = bl ]
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In this section we describe how such edge information can be aggregated at the
node level, then contributed to aggregate network statistics, and privatized under
contributor-privacy as a distribution with low sensitivity. Individuals can be expected
to be familiar with basic information about their relationships and their friends. Algorithm 3 describes a general approach to collecting edge information from an individual
that may be implemented with any of the edge propositions listed above. EdgePropertyQuery(Mutual()) asks individuals for the proportion of their network edges that are
mutual (for instance, whether someone they follow is also one of their own followers);
this collects information about the node’s reciprocity. EdgePropertyQuery(SameType()) asks individuals for the proportion of their friends are similar to them (for
example, whether their friends share their race); this collects information about the
node’s degree of homophily (see Section 2.3.2).
Algorithm 3 A survey gathering information about the properties of friendship
edges.
function EdgePropertyQuery (PROPERTY)
outdegree ← Query(“How many friends do you have within the PoI?”)
positivecount ← Query(“How many of your friendships have PROPERTY?”)
return (outdegree, positivecount)
end function

Once this information is collected at the node level, it can be aggregated into a distribution across the network (see Figure 4.4). Contributor-privacy requires that each
node’s contributed information be protected. Because the information is collected
into a histogram, as in the degree distribution, the contributor-privacy sensitivity is
1 and the distribution can be privatized with relatively little noise. The complete
procedure for creating and privatizing the distribution is given in Algorithm 4.
Privatized edge-property distributions can be applied to a variety of social network analysis contexts. For example, data collected from EdgePropertyQuery(SameTypeGrades ()) would provide information about the extent to which students associate

52

Algorithm 4 Privatizing edge property distribution data.
function PrivateEdgePropertyDistribution(data, precision)
Initialize (bins = [] ∗ (10precision + 1))
binLabels ← [”0/10precision ”, ”1/(10precision − 1)”, ...”10precision /0”]
for all (outDegree, positiveCount) ∈ data do
ratio ← positiveCount/outDegree
binN um ← round(10precision ∗ (ratio))
bins[binN um] ← bins[binN um] + 1
end for
for i = 0 → 10precision + 1 do
bins[i] ← bins[i]+ LaplacianNoise(1)
end for
return bins, binLabels
end function
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Fig. 4.4.: Contributor sensitivity = 1. Information about prevalence of edge properties such as reciprocity, homophily, or prevalence of particular edge labels (such as
friend/enemy labels), can be collected from nodes with low sensitivity.

with others at the same level of academic proﬁciency. The data collected from EdgePropertyQuery (Mutual-Signed()) would provide information about the extent to
which positive and negative edges are reciprocated in kind (see Section 4.4.2).

4.2.4

Centrality: Popularity Graph

We propose a very diﬀerent approach for collecting and privatizing information
about inﬂuential nodes within a network; one that satisﬁes contributor-privacy (by
protecting individuals’ data contributions) and leverages individuals’ knowledge about
their community. Recall that viable centrality analyses beyond degree-distributions
do not currently exist for the edge-privacy or node-privacy standards. We deﬁne
a popularity graph: a synthetic network that represents the social structure among
inﬂuential community members (Algorithm 5).
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Fig. 4.5.: A Popularity Graph with edge thickness indicating edge-weight

Given a population of interest in which the number of individuals in the total
population set is public information, 2 , the algorithm proceeds as follows. Individuals
in the population are asked to: “list your three most popular friends within the
speciﬁed population group”. The algorithm proceeds in two steps: a data aggregation
and privatization step, followed by a post-processing step which uses the privatized
data to produce the popularity graph. The sensitivity of the ﬁrst step is 3, while the
second step manipulates only privatized data and thus incurs no sensitivity cost.
The ﬁrst step in the algorithm builds a social network across as follows: A base
graph is created containing suﬃcient nodes for all members of the population of
interest, and undirected edges of weight 0 are added between all pairs of nodes. The
data collected from the survey is then added to the graph: when two popular people
are listed on the same survey, the weight of the edge connecting them is incremented.
Thus, each individual’s data increments the weight of the three edges connecting the
three ’popular’ nodes contributed by that individual. The sensitivity of the popularity
graph is 3, since a maximum 3 edge-weight values can change if a participant adds or
retracts their data.
To privatize the data, appropriate Laplacian noise to cover a function sensitivity
of 3 is added to all edge-weights. Then the post-processing step is applied: edges
with low weight are eliminated, and the graph is anonymized. The resulting weighted
2

Note that this is not the number of individuals who contribute their information to the data-set,
which is protected under contributor-privacy
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Algorithm 5 Privatizing centrality data.
function PrivateCentrality(importanceT, dataI )
V ←N
E[i][j] ← 0 ∀i, j ∈ V
for all i ∈ I do
∀pj , pk ∈dataI [i], E[pj , pk ]←E[pj , pk ] + 1
end for
for all i, j ∈ popular − population do
E[i, j] ← E[i, j]+ LaplacianNoise(3)
if E[i, j] < importanceT then
E[i, j] ← 0
end if
end for
return P opularityGraph = (V, E)
end function
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popularity graph is published (Figure 4.5). This graph can be used to understand
the underlying social inﬂuence structure of the population, identifying social clusters
and the bridges between them. The privacy of data provided by the query participants is fully protected; however, the subjects who appear as popular nodes in the
graph will clearly be less secure and this analysis may not be appropriate in all contexts (in a sexual relationship network, for example, analyses with greater subject
privacy would be preferable). However, for many populations though, the popularity graph should be suﬃcient protection: anonymity, noisy edges, and the fact
that the artiﬁcially-constructed graph will lack detailed substructures often used for
re-identiﬁcation attacks, will all contribute to protecting the privacy of the query
subjects.

4.3

Utility Analysis
The basic contributor-privacy algorithms we have presented above have low sen-

sitivity: Triangle counts, degree distributions, edge-property distributions each have
a sensitivity of 1, while popularity graphs have a sensitivity of 3. In this section we’ll
discuss the relationship between sensitivity and utility.
Recall from section 2.1 that the sensitivity of a set of analyses over a single dataset is equal to the sum of their individual sensitivities. Furthermore, if an analysis
is performed over two disjoint data-sets such that an individual can contribute to
at most one set of analysis results, the sensitivity of the two analyses is computed
independently. A standard social network analysis scenario involves performing a
set of analyses across several networks and then comparing the results; for example,
we might perform a degree-distribution and two edge-property distribution analyses
across four diﬀerent networks. The sensitivity of the analysis for each network is
equal to 3 (a sensitivity cost of 1 for the degree-distribution, and a total cost of 2 for
the two edge-property distributions). In order to privatize this analysis set, laplacian
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noise suﬃcient to privatize a sensitivity of 3 must be added to each analysis (the
degree-distribution and both edge-property distributions) across all four networks.
The eﬀect of this noise on analysis results is dependent on two factors: the size
of the data-set and the size of the output structure being privatized (the number of
noise samples taken). Because privatization noise must be added to every ’bucket’ of
histogram-formatted data, privatized data-structures with more bucket counts have
a higher probability of sampling at least one large value of noise: A LCC distribution
with 10 counts has a very low probability of sampling a large noise value during
privatization, in contrast to a Popularity Graph with 500,000 edge weights. Whether a
sampled noise value is suﬃciently large to obscure the true data patterns is dependent
on the size of the data-set: In a data-set with 100 individuals, a sampled noise value
of 10 may be large enough to overwhelm the true value of a histogram count. In a
data-set with 10,000 individuals, the eﬀect of a noise value of 10 on the aggregate
data patterns is less signiﬁcant. Figure 4.6 gives the expected number of large noise
values sampled depending on the output data-structure size and analysis sensitivity
(with  = ln(2)).

Fig. 4.6.: Expected number of high noise values given function sensitivity and number
of noise samples taken, with  = ln(2).

Our hypothetical analysis set above (assuming a degree-distribution cut-oﬀ of 80
and an edge-property range of 11) has a total of 4 ∗ (80 + 22) = 408 histogram buckets
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across the four network analyses, and a total sensitivity of 3. To compute the expected
number of large noise values, we use the cumulative probability distribution of the
laplacian distribution, given in Lemma 4.4. In our example, the expected number of
noise values larger than 10 appearing across the entire four network analysis set is
19.84, and the expected number of noise values larger than 35 is 0.06. In real world
networks with tens of thousands of nodes, such as the ones we investigate in the next
section, this amount of noise is unlikely to have a signiﬁcant impact on results utility.
We will demonstrate this empirically. In much smaller networks, it may be necessary
to reduce the analysis output space (for example, a researcher may choose a smaller
degree-distribution cut-oﬀ in smaller networks), increase  (and accept the reduced
level of privacy protection), or perform fewer analyses.
Lemma 4.4 Expected Large Noise Values: Given an analysis with sensitivity
ΔF and an output of size H (requiring H noise samples to privatize), a privacy
parameter , the expected number of Laplacian noise values sampled larger than k is:
E[#Lap(

4.4

ΔF
ΔF
) > k|H] = H ∗ 0.5e−k/ 


Practical Application
The contributor-private analysis techniques described in this chapter are carefully

designed to minimize analysis sensitivity and output size, such that privacy can be
achieved with relatively little added noise. We believe that these algorithms present
an eﬀective tool-set for easily implemented, high-utility, privacy-preserving social network analysis.
As evidence of this, we now give a in-depth practical demonstration of contributorprivate network analysis techniques on real world social networks. For our experiments we use the networks provided by an widely-used social network analysis resource: the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection (SNAP) [55]. These networks
have been published online as anonymized edge and node sets, and have been refer-
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enced by many researchers working across the social network analysis ﬁeld. We will
thus assume that any privacy risks inherent in the simply-annonymized data predate
this thesis due to their public availability, and we will include both privatized and
non-privatized analysis results for comparison purposes.
To demonstrate the range of contributor-private analyses, we perform three analysis sets across three diﬀerent categories of networks. In the ﬁrst two categories, we
compare analysis results across pairs of networks that possess the same data-structure
format but are drawn from very diﬀerent populations. In the third category, we explore a challenging privacy scenario by demonstrating a higher sensitivity analysis
against a smaller data-set with a large output space:
• Directed Networks: Enron Email Network, WikiVote Network
• Signed Directed Networks: Slashdot Zoo Enemy/Friend Network, Epinions
Trust Network
• Small Undirected Network: Facebook Ego-Network
Recall from Section 4.3 that sensitivity is computed across the entire analysis set
for each graph. In our ﬁrst two analysis sets, both the total analysis sensitivity and the
data-output size are relatively small in comparison to the size of the data, resulting in
a very small eﬀect on utility that is generally not visible when the analysis results are
graphed. For these analyses we also include truncated graphs with reduced ranges
such that the privatization noise is visible, as well as a record of the noise values
added to each distribution. In the third analysis set the data-set is much smaller
and our output space is much larger; thus, the eﬀect of noise is more signiﬁcant. In
all other analyses in this dissertation, we use a default parameter of  = ln(2)–Note
that, given Deﬁnition 2.2, a choice of  = ln(2) provides the privacy guarantee that
no result will be more than twice as likely to be produced by one data-set as by its
neighbor. In the third analysis set in this section, we will demonstrate the eﬀect of
an increased  on privatized results. Increasing  weakens the privacy guarantee, but
increases the utility of privatized results.
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To compare results between networks of diﬀerent sizes, we ﬁrst normalize the distributions. This is a post-processing step that occurs after privatization and incurs no
sensitivity cost. We use a natural deﬁnition for the privatized normalized distribution,
as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.5 Privatized Normalization: Given a distribution Hpriv with privatized (noisy) counts: p1 , p2 ...pk , we deﬁne the privatized normalization as:
Hpriv−norm = p1 /npriv , p1 /npriv ..pk /npriv
With np riv = Σi pi .

4.4.1

Directed Networks: Voting and Email Data

In our ﬁrst analysis set, we investigate two directed networks.

Data-sets
Our ﬁrst data-set is the Enron Email network. During the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s investigation of the company, about a half million of the company’s
internal emails were posted publicly online. A social network data-set has been drawn
from this data by including nodes for each individual and adding directed edges to
represent email exchanges (ie, an edge is added leading from node i to node j if individual i sent at least one email to individual j). The resulting graph has 36,692
nodes and 183,831 edges (ie, an average degree of 5). In this graph, contributor data
consists of the emails sent by one individual, along with email relationships between
individuals in the contributor’s neighborhood (presumed to be potentially observable
by the individual).
Our second data-set is taken from a procedure that occurs in Wikipedia’s editor
community. Content on Wikipedia is composed, edited and monitored by volunteers,
and a subset of especially dedicated volunteers are given ’administrator’ status with a
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higher level of access privileges. Administrator positions are awarded as the result of a
community deliberation process that involves a voting round: fellow volunteers (both
common volunteers and current administrators) vote on administrator candidates.
A social network is drawn from this data by including nodes for every voter and
candidate, and adding directed edges to indicate votes (ie, an edge is added leading
from node i to node j if individual i voted in support of individual j). Note that this
is not a bipartite graph: candidates can and often do cast votes for other candidates.
The resulting graph has 7,115 nodes and 103,689 edges (an average degree of 14.5). In
this graph, contributor data consists of all the votes cast by one individual, along with
votes exchanged between individuals in the contributor’s neighborhood (presumed to
be potentially observable by the individual).
In analyzing these graphs, we will investigate the following questions:
1. Does the email network or voting network have higher transitivity? Transitivity in the voting network indicates groups of individuals mutually supporting
each other’s bids for administratorship. Transitivity in the email network may
indicate collaboration networks among groups of coworkers.
2. Does the email network or voting network have a more hierarchical structure
(many low and few high degree nodes)? Low degree nodes in the voting network
indicate individuals who cast few votes, while low degree nodes in the email
network indicate individuals who sent emails to only a few coworkers.

Privatized Analysis
For this analysis set we will collect a local clustering coeﬃcient (LCC) distribution
and a degree distribution from each network, and then privatize the results using
laplacian noise, as described in the previous section. Because we are interested in
the distribution of LCC values across the network as a whole, rather than binned by
degree, for this experiment we use a one-dimensional LCC histogram in place of the
two-dimensional histogram presented in Figure 4.2.
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The total sensitivity of this analysis set is 2, with each analysis incurring a sensitivity cost of 1. Laplacian noise suﬃcient to cover this sensitivity is added to each
output count in each analysis to produce the privatized results. The following two
ﬁgures, Figure 4.7 and 4.8, display the output of the analysis set. Because the of the
low sensitivity of these analyses, the privatization noise is very small in comparison to
the scale of the data; we include plots with truncated axes in which the eﬀect of the
noise is visible. In general, the privatized results in this analysis set provide, literally,
no visible loss in utility.

Privatized Results Comparison
To perform a privacy-preserving comparative analysis of two networks, we normalize the privatized results according to Deﬁnition 4.5. The resulting plots are presented
in Figure 4.9 and 4.10.
To demonstrate that privatized social network analysis can provide useful insights
into the populations and social dynamics being studied, we now return to the two
questions we proposed above.
First, does the email network or the voting network show higher transitivity?
Looking at the privatized LCC distribution data across both networks (see Figure 4.9)
we see that most individuals in the network have a low clustering coeﬃcient, while
many individuals in the email network have a very high clustering coeﬃcient: groups
of individuals in the Wikipedia administrator candidate pool were less likely to trade
votes amongst each other than employees at Enron were likely to collaborate in cliquelike groups through email exchanges with their coworkers. This seems reasonably
intuitive. Interestingly, we note that the Enron distribution also has some weight at
a relatively lower LCC range of 0.2-0.6; potentially this represents individuals

63

(a) Wiki-Vote LCC Distribution

(b) Enron Email Network LCC Distribution

(c) Wiki-Vote truncated to show noise

(d) Enron Email truncated to show noise

(e) Wiki-Vote privatization noise

(f) Enron Email privatization noise

Fig. 4.7.: Local Clustering Coeﬃcient (LCC) distribution data for the Enron Email
and Wiki-Vote networks, privatized under contributor-privacy.
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(a) Wiki-Vote Network Degree Distribution

(b) Enron Email Degree Distribution

(c) Wiki-Vote truncated to show noise

(d) Enron Email truncated to show noise

(e) Wiki-Vote privatization noise

(f) Enron Email privatization noise

Fig. 4.8.: Degree Distribution Data for the Enron Email and Wiki-Vote networks,
privatized under contributor-privacy
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Fig. 4.9.: Comparison of normalized privatized local clustering coeﬃcient distribution
between Wiki-Vote and Enron Email networks.

Fig. 4.10.: Comparison of normalized privatized degree distribution between WikiVote and Enron Email networks.

in administrative staﬀ positions or leadership positions who distributed email
across disparate organizational groups that were not otherwise well-connected. We
also note the small increase at LCC = 1 in the voting distribution; this suggests that

66
some portion of administrator candidates did form voting cliques to mutually support
each other’s bids for administratorship.
Next, we investigate whether the email network or voting network showed a more
hierarchical degree distribution (see Figure 4.10) . Privatization noise and the degree
cut-oﬀ of 60 reduces the level of detail available about the few individuals in each
graph with very high degree (this is a natural consequence of protecting these distinctive individuals’ privacy). However, looking at trends across both populations as
a whole, we see the distribution curves are very similar for both for very low degree
nodes and higher degree nodes. We also note, though, that the email network presents
a distinctive behavior around degree 3: There are many nodes in the Enron graph
that have only one or two email partners, and there is a another large set of nodes
that has between four and eight email partners. This may be evidence of collaboration substructures speciﬁc to the company organization. If node labels specifying
position type were added to the network data, we could explore this question further
in a two-dimensional privatized histogram (similar to the histogram recording degree
and LCC presented in Figure 4.2).

4.4.2

Signed Networks: Friend/Enemy and Trust Graphs

In our second analyses set, we move onto two directed networks with signed edges
that are labeled as either positive or negative.

Data-set
Epinions is a consumer review site that allows users to report trust (or distrust)
relationships with other reviewers. This information is combined into a single network
referred to as the Web of Trust, which is then used to algorithmically determine which
reviews are displayed to a user in the future. A signed, directed social network is
drawn from this data by including a node for each user and a signed directed edge
for every trust relationship (ie, when user i registers a trust relationship with user j,
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a directed edge from i to j is added with label +1; for distrust relationships a −1
label is used). The complete network has 75,879 nodes and 508,837 edges, with an
average degree of 6.7. Contributor data in this network is the set of trust and distrust
relationships submitted by the user, and the set of trust and distrust relationships as
received and observed by the user.
Slashdot is a technology-related news aggregater and forum with a very active
community. The Slashdot Zoo, introduced in 2002, allows users to tag other users
as either ”friend” or ”foe”. A signed, directed network is drawn from this data by
including a node for every user who participates in the Zoo, along with directed
signed edges indicating friend and foe tags (when user i tags user j as a ”foe”, a
directed edge with label −1 is added from i to j; friendship edges are labeled +1).
The complete network has 82,168 nodes and 948,464 edges, with an average degree
of 11.5. Contributor data in this network is the set of friend and foe tags registered
by the user, and the set of friend and foe tags as received and observed by the user.
In this analysis set, we’ll investigate the following questions:
1. In signed networks, individuals’ outdegree can be broken into counts of positive
and negative edges. If the individual participates more in negative relationships
than positive ones, their negative outdegree will be greater relative to their
positive outdegree. Do individuals tend to be more negative in the social Zoo
network where ’foe’ relationships may not be intended seriously? Or do they
tend to be more negative in the trust network, where negative edges have a
serious meaning and actual consequences on future interactions?
2. Are individuals more likely to receive responses (form mutual relationships,
regardless of sign), to the social relationships extended in the Zoo network or
the trust relationships extended in the Epinions network?
3. Considering sign, are individuals more likely to recieve responses in kind to
relationship edges extended in the Zoo network or the trust network? How likely
are people to indulge in mutual friendships and foe-ships in each network?
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For this analysis set we will collect four types of edge-property information across
the two networks. We collect two edge property ratio distributions: the ﬁrst counting
the ratio of positive to negative edges that a node participates in, and the second
counting the ratio of mutual edges (regardless of sign) that a node participates in.
Each of these distributions has a sensitivity of 1. We also collect statistics about
individuals’ tendency to have their extended edges reciprocated in kind: we collect
counts of the number of individuals who received positive responses to more than half
of their extended positive edges (and the complementary count of those who did not),
as well as a count of the number of individuals who received negative responses to more
than half of their extended negative edges (and the complementary count of those
who did not). Each pair of complementary counts can be represented as a two-bin
histogram, which we then privatized and normalized to attain privatized estimates
of the probability that a random node received in-kind responses to a majority of
its positive and negative edges. Note that the same individual may contribute to
both count pairs (eg, an individual whose positive edges are all reciprocated but
whose negative edges are not reciprocated will contribute to the primary count of the
positive count pair and the complementary count of the negative count pair). Thus,
these analyses incur a sensitivity cost of 2, and the sensitivity of the full analysis set
is 4. Laplacian noise suﬃcient to cover this sensitivity is added to each output count
in each analysis to produce the privatized results.
The following three ﬁgures, Figure 4.11, Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.4.2, display the
output of the analysis set. Because the privatization noise is very small in comparison
to the scale of the data and the analyses have been carefully designed to incur minimal
sensitivity cost, the eﬀect of privatization noise on the results is again negligible. In
the ﬁrst two analyses, we include plots with truncated axes in which the eﬀect of the
noise is visible, and in the third ﬁgure we extend the precision to three decimal place
in order to ensure the eﬀect of added noise is clear. In general, we can see that the
privatization noise in this second analysis set also has negligible eﬀect on utility.
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(a) Epinion P/N Edge Ratio Distribution

(b) Slashdot P/N Edge Ratio Distribution

(c) Epinion results truncated to show noise

(d) Slashdot results truncated to show noise

(e) Epinion privatization noise

(f) Slashdot privatization noise

Fig. 4.11.: Positive/Negative Edge Ratio (P/N) Distribution data for the Slashdot
Zoo and Epinion Web of Trust networks, privatized under contributor-privacy

Privatized Results Comparisons
To perform a privacy-preserving comparative analysis of two networks, we normalize the privatized results of the ﬁrst two analyses according to Deﬁnition 4.5. The
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(a) Epinion ME Ratio Distribution

(b) Slashdot ME Ratio Distribution

(c) Epinion results truncated to show noise

(d) Slashdot results truncated to show noise

(e) Epinion privatization noise

(f) Slashdot privatization noise

Fig. 4.12.: Mutual Edge Ratio (ME) Distribution data for the Slashdot Zoo and
Epinion Web of Trust networks, privatized under contributor-privacy

resulting plots are presented in Figure 4.14 and 4.15. Results from the third analysis
appear in Figure 4.4.2.
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Fig. 4.13.: Percentages of individuals who received responses In kind To a majority
of their extended positive and negative edges

Fig. 4.14.: Comparison of normalized privatized positive/negative edge ratio distribution between Epinion and Slashdot networks.

To demonstrate that privatized social network analysis can provide useful insights
into the social dynamics of signed networks, we now address the three questions we
proposed above.
First, we consider whether individuals are likely to be more positive (listing more
friends than enemies) or negative (listing more enemies than friends) in each network
(see Figure 4.14). Interestingly, the positive/negative edge ratio distributions from
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Fig. 4.15.: Comparison of normalized privatized mutual edge ratio distribution between Epinion and Slashdot networks.

both the trust and the social networks have a very similar overall structure: A few
individuals list only negative relationships (distrusted reviewers and foes); a bump in
the distributions at 50/50 indicates that another group of individuals precisely splits
their edges between positive and negative labels; a gradual increase in the second half
of the distribution indicates that many people list more friends than foes; and a ﬁnal
sharp rise indicates that very many people list only positive edges. The fact that these
basic patterns hold in the distributions of both networks implies that even though the
edges are given with diﬀerent intent across diﬀerent populations, lighthearted ’friend’
and ’foe’ status assigned in the Slashdot Zoo network and serious trust/distrust status
registered in the Epinions Web of Trust, individuals have a similar overall approach
to positive and negative relationships in both contexts. However, we note that the
Epinions distribution is slightly more extreme, with more individuals listing only
distrust or only trust, while the Slashdot network has slightly more weight in the
middle of the distribution.
Our second question related to the relative reciprocity of the networks: were
individuals extending an edge in the social network or in the trust network more
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likely to receive a mutual edge in response? In this analysis we did not consider
the sign of the edge; reciprocity with respect to relationship sign will be considered
in the third analysis. Again, the two distributions are strikingly similar, with two
exceptions: First, we note that individuals in the Epinions network were more likely
to participate in zero mutual edges (declining to rate anyone who had rated them)(see
Figure 4.15). Recall that in the contributor-privacy framework, data is only collected
from individuals who participate in the data-set, and thus all of the individuals in the
Epinions distribution have submitted at least one trust rating for another reviewer.
When an Epinions member in our data-set reciprocates 0% of her received edges,
she is still actively participating in the network by extending trust relationships to
others, while ignoring her own received trust relationships. Potentially this set of
users is interacting with the network more as a rating system (ensuring that the
reviewers they like are promoted in their feeds) than as a traditional social network
(forming networks of mutual relationships with other members). We also note that the
Slashdot network, by contrast, has a greater percentage of nodes which reciprocate
only a small percentage, 10%-20%, of their received edges. One possibility is that
this indicates a group of individuals who participate both in a few small clusters
of reciprocating friendships/foeships and also extend many unreciprocated edges out
beyond their friend group (possibly to a few high centrality nodes, or to random
individuals of passing interest). As in the degree distribution, expanding this analysis
into a two-dimensional histogram would allow us to explore this question further,
without increasing sensitivity. Dimensions we might explore include the number of
local (within the ego-network) communities each node participates in, or the number
of high-degree nodes among each node’s neighbors.
Finally, we consider reciprocity with respect to edge sign (see Figure ). Here we
see that people who extended positive edges were more likely to have a majority
of those edges reciprocated in the Epinions network than in the Slashdot network,
while those that extended negative links were more likely to have a majority of those
links reciprocated in the Slashdot network than in the Epinions network. A plausible
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explanation for this behavior arises from the networks’ distinct link semantics: a
friend extending a ’foe’ edge to an associate in jest on Slashdot may be likely to have
it reciprocated in kind, while distrust ratings in the Epinion network may be ignored
(especially if the distrusted users are false ”astroturf” reviewers who are reimbursed by
the sites they review and may be unlikely to participate in the trust web themselves).
By contrast, mutual trust (positive) relationships may be actively encouraged by a
Web of Trust network that gives trusted reviews high priority in a user’s information
feed.

4.4.3

Small Undirected Network: Facebook Ego-network

In our third analysis set, we look at a smaller, undirected network and a set of
analyses that require greater privatization noise.

Data-sets
Our last data-set is an anonymized ego-network taken from the Facebook social
network, with the ego-node itself omitted: Given a speciﬁc anonymous member of
Facebook, this network was created by adding a node for each of the member’s friends
(but not the individual himself/herself), and then including all edges that connect
the member’s friends. All edges are undirected in the Facebook network because
Facebook’s policy enforces mutual friendships. This produces a relatively small network with 534 nodes and 9,626 edges (an average degree of 18). Contributors in this
context are the individual nodes in the network (this excludes the original ego-node
which was used to create the sampled graph), and the contributor data we will focus
on in this analysis will be each node’s knowledge of the relative popularity of their
neighbors (represented by node degree).
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Privatized Analysis
In this analysis we will explore a harder to privatize social network analysis scenario. To demonstrate the eﬀect of output size on analysis privatizability we perform
two independent analyses (without summing total sensitivity) over the same set of
contributor data; our second analysis has output size quadratic relative to the ﬁrst
analysis’ output size. In order to produce results with good utility, we vary our privacy
parameter  (we use  = ln(2) ≈ 0.69 up to this point in Chapter 4, and throughout
Chapter 5). We consider two choices for this increase:  = (3/2)(ln2) ≈ 1.04 and
 = 3(ln2) ≈ 2.08. We note that larger values of  appear in existing diﬀerentially
private social network analysis literature [47], [19].
Both analyses draw on the same information from contributors: a list of each contributor’s three most popular (highest degree) friends. Each analysis has a sensitivity
of 3.
The ﬁrst analysis compiles this information into a ’popularity distribution’ which
counts the number of times each node was included in a contributor’s list. The privatized results are then post-processed, removing all nodes with a privatized popularity
count below the threshold of 20 and forming a simple anonymous list of the popular
individuals. This anonymous list by itself provides relatively little information about
the underlying social network, beyond an estimate of the number of nodes with high
centrality.
We can instead produce more detailed information from this data, at the cost of
a large output size, by applying the Popularity Graph algorithm (which is described
in detail in Section 4.2.4). The resulting, post-processed popularity graph gives additional structural information about the connectedness (Ie, the number of mutual
friends) between the high centrality nodes that are submitted by contributors.
We reiterate that this analysis is not appropriate for all privacy contexts; the subject data sensitivity is quite large in this analysis (δF (s) ∈ O(n), a function of the
maximum number of votes that may be cast across all edges in the popularity graph
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that include subject s). Contributor-privacy protects the friendship information submitted by individual members of the network, but the set of high-centrality nodes
(that the contributors identify communally) may be re-indentiﬁable in the anonymous popularity graph. As always, although privacy-preserving data-mining protects
individuals’ contributed data, the consequences of releasing the aggregate results is
an ethical question that must also be considered. A popularity graph of a sexual relationship network would not be appropriate. One example of an appropriate use-case
would be a popularity graph of a corporate oﬃce, where individual’s reported relationships with their immediate coworkers require protection, but results identifying
the most inﬂuential individuals are not problematic.

Discussion of Results
Figure 4.16 displays the results (both raw and post-processed) at both values of
epsilon. The post-processing cut-oﬀ threshold is represented by the horizontal black
bar at y = 20. Recall that, although the analysis set in previous section was performed
with

ΔF


= 4 which is greater that the current analysis, the visible eﬀect of the noise

on privatized results was much smaller. As we discussed in Section 4.3 (see Table
4.6), output size has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the degree to which laplacian noise eﬀects
analysis utility; the greater output size combined with a smaller data-set (reducing
the scale of the output values) is the cause of the increase in perceptible noise in these
plots.
However, although the popularity distribution results are noisier than previous
analysis sets, we are still able to learn about the population of interest. The postprocessing eliminates most noise values, and preserves all large true data-values. At
the greater epsilon value, we see that the privatized popularity list (the set of nodes
whose popularity vote bars fall above the threshold line) is nearly identical to the nonprivatized data; the privatized list includes two additional nodes, 3836 and 3680, that
would have fallen slightly below the threshold without the addition of noise. At the
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lower value of epsilon, the privatized list includes seven values that would have fallen
below the threshold without additional noise (and in fact two nodes, 3743 and 3759,
would have fallen well below the popularity threshold without assistance); however
again, all large true data values are preserved and nodes with very large popularity
in the true data are easily recognizable in the privatized distribution.
Although the privatized data-sets contain some false-positives (values that would
have fallen below the cut-oﬀ threshold without the addition of signiﬁcant positive
noise), there are no false-negatives (values that would have fallen above the threshold
without the addition of signiﬁcant negative noise). Our proposed social network
analyses fall into two broad categories: Analyses such as LCC distributions that
require small output sizes and see small impact from noise addition, and analyses
such as degree-distributions that have larger output sizes but contain only a sparse
set of large positive values in the non-privatized data. Because noise values are
sampled independently of each other, there is a low probability that the few large
negative values sampled from the noise distribution will occur at the same locations
as the small, sparse set of signiﬁcantly large true values. The lower probability of
false-negatives in these analyses is demonstrated empirically in this analysis-set and
in the analysis sets of Chapter 5.
Figures 4.17 displays the results of the popularity graph analysis (ie, the popularity
graph’s edge weights) at the two values of epsilon. Again, the horizontal black line
indicates the post-processing cut-oﬀ threshold. Note that with the smaller value of
epsilon, the increased output size requires suﬃciently many noise samples such that
many very large values are sampled, overwhelming the original data. However, with
the higher value of epsilon, our post-processed results are very similar to the nonprivatized data. The popularity graph itself is depicted in Figure 4.18 with edge
color indicating edge weight. Lightweight edges represent connections between high
centrality nodes which were observed by fewer individuals; these edges indicate weaker
connections in the true network and are also more susceptible to privatization noise
(for example, a small amount of negative noise might remove (3442,3455) from the
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privatized graph. However, the strong edges in the non-privatized graph are also
strong in the privatized graph. The popularity graph shows three clusters of popular
nodes; the second cluster is dominated by two strong edges connecting popular node
3596 with nodes 3545 and 3830. These three nodes all appear among the nodes with
high weights in the popularity list of the previous analysis, however the popularity
graph oﬀers insight into their relationships with each other.
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(a) Popularity Distribution ( ΔF
 = 1)

(b) Popularity Distribution ( ΔF
 = 2)

(c) Post-processed Popularity List ( ΔF
 = 1)

(d) Post-processed Popularity List ( ΔF
 = 2)

Fig. 4.16.: Popularity Distribution results for Facebook Ego-Network
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(a) Popularity Graph ( ΔF
 = 1)

(b) Popularity Graph ( ΔF
 = 2)

(c) Post-processed Popularity Graph( ΔF
 = 1)

(d) Post-processed Popularity Graph( ΔF
 = 2)

Fig. 4.17.: Popularity Graph results for Facebook Ego-Network
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Fig. 4.18.: Privatized Popularity graph from Facebook Ego-Network: Higher edgeweights are represented by darker edge colors.
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5. PARTITION PRIVACY
Many questions about social structures are naturally asked over a collection of graphs
rather than one monolithic social network. Social scientists studying interpersonal
interaction run experiments over large collections of small social groups, collecting
social networks for each distinct group [56,57]. Collections of disjoint social networks
can be implicit in larger graphs as well. Node properties such as dormitory, major,
university, or geographical location can be used to partition large graphs into meaningful sets of disjoint local social networks [58]. Partition-privacy applies diﬀerential
privacy to sets of graphs.

5.1

Deﬁnition
In partition-privacy, neighboring possible worlds are ones in which one subgraph

is added or removed from the set of disjoint subgraphs comprising the data-set.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Partition-Privacy: Deﬁne a partitioned graph to be comprised of
separate components such that G = {gi } for disjoint subgraphs gi . A privatized query
Q satisﬁes partition-privacy if, for all R ⊆ range(Q), and all pairs of graphs G1 , G2
where G1 = G2 − gi for some gi ∈ G1 :
P r[Q(D1 ) ∈ R]
≤ e
P r[Q(D2 ) ∈ R]
Partition-privacy applies when researchers wish to perform tests of hypotheses
about social behavior across groups, such as “Is clustering coeﬃcient correlated with
gender in dormitory friendship structures?”. We will demonstrate in this chapter that
this useful sub-class of analyses is especially amenable to privatization.
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5.1.1

Privacy Analysis

Partition-privacy provides broader protection than single node-privacy: it provides
protection at the level of entire social groups rather than individuals.
For functions whose sensitivity under Diﬀerential Privacy Variant 2 (see Deﬁnition
2.1) is less than or equal to their sensitivity under Diﬀerential Privacy Variant 1,
partition-privacy implies k-node-privacy for nodes belonging to the same partition:
Given a function F across a set of network partitions, adding or removing a set of nodes
belonging to a single partition produces one of three eﬀects: it alters the function
value in at most one partition, it results in the removal of a partition from the set (if
partition was comprised entirely of k nodes that were removed), or it results in the
addition of a partition to the set (if k added nodes comprise a new partition). Which
of these three cases produces the greater impact on the analysis results depends on the
function being computed. Partition-privacy sensitivity is computed as the function
value change under the addition or removal of one network partition, analogous to
traditional diﬀerential privacy variant 1. In cases where this sensitivity is greater than
the sensitivity computed under variant 2 (in which one partition changes its function
value arbitrarily), partition-privacy will provide k-node privacy for any set of k nodes
belonging to the same partition.
Recall from Section 2.1 that the sensitivity of histograms in particular is 1 under
variant 1, and 2 under variant 2: When an entity is added or removed from the
histogram (as in variant 1), one histogram count changes by at most 1 producing a
sensitivity cost of 1. Alternatively when an entity’s value is changed (as in variant
2), one histogram count increases by at most 1 and one histogram count decreases
by at most 1, as the entity changes which count it appears in in the histogram; this
produces a sensitivity cost of 2. Because the partition-private analyses in this chapter
are based on histograms, they will provide k-node privacy (for nodes belonging in the
same partition) with privacy-parameter node = 2partition .
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Note that the broader protection provided by partition-privacy is important in
real world scenarios in which group-level data is sensitive. For example, under degreerestricted node-privacy [19], researchers could choose to publish data that assigned an
average sexual promiscuity rating to each high school in a given state, using privatized
node degree data from the sexual interaction networks of students in each school. This
could be seen an invasion of the students’ privacy, even though no individual student’s
information would be distinguishable in the privatized results. With partition-privacy,
each of the school networks would be protected, and only aggregate information about
the distribution across the state would be publishable.
Furthermore, while existing node-private algorithms require the addition of considerable amounts of noise and provide relatively little utility in high-degree graphs
(recall Section 3.3.1), partition-private analyses can require very little noise to implement. We will present a diverse selection of analyses that can be easily privatized
under partition-privacy.

5.2

Basic Algorithms
In this section we will present several easy-to-use algorithmic tools that can enable

social network researchers to learn about populations while guaranteeing partitionprivacy. In the next section we will demonstrate the practical application of partitionprivate analysis on a diverse set of real world social network data-sets.

5.2.1

Triangle Count

In applications that require a collection of disjoint social networks, even more
detailed privatized analysis is possible. Partition-privacy allows arbitrary analysis of
disjoint subgraphs in the data-set and then privatizes the aggregation of the independent results. Assume an analysis has been performed on each disjoint subgraph,
producing either a numerical result with a publicly known range (e.g., the global
clustering coeﬃcient of the graph), a category result (the gender of the dorm repre-
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sented by the graph), or any combination of numerical and categorical results. The
collection of graphs may now be viewed as a collection of multi-attribute data points.
Removing or adding one graph from the collection is equivalent to removing or adding
one of these data points; we can apply traditional diﬀerential privacy techniques to
this set of independent data points as though we were working with tabular data
over individuals. Two low-sensitivity techniques are very useful here: histograms and
privatized means. We will demonstrate the application of these techniques in the
examples below, beginning with an application of partition-privacy to triangle-count
data.
The global clustering coeﬃcient is the proportion of wedges in the graph (where
one person has a two friends) that are closed to form a triangle (i.e., the two friends
are also friends with each other); formally, CC(G) =

3∗[number of triangles in G]
.
[number of wedges in G]

A

graph with no triangles has a clustering coeﬃcient of 0; a clique has a clustering
coeﬃcient of 1. The clustering coeﬃcient of a graph is a useful normalized measure
of its social cohesion. However, it is diﬃcult to draw meaningful conclusions about
the population being studied using one piece of data in isolation. Given a collection
of social networks, we can identify meaningful patterns of behavior by comparing
clustering coeﬃcients across networks.
Assume we want to examine how attribute X of a social group aﬀects its degree
of social cohesion. For example, we could study the relationship between the gender
of a college dormitory and the clustering coeﬃcient of the social network within the
dorm. Given a data-set consisting of a collection of social networks for each possible
value of X (a set of male, female and co-ed dorms), we ﬁrst compute the global
clustering coeﬃcient over each individual network. We can then compute the mean
of the clustering coeﬃcients for each value of the attribute X, add noise to privatize
the result, and release the privatized means (see Figure 5.1).
The mean of a set of bounded numerical values has low sensitivity when the
number of values is publicly known. Consider the mean M aleDormsClustering =
M/N where M = ΣG∈M aleDorms clustering coeﬃcient(G) and N is the number of
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Fig. 5.1.: Two collections of networks (blue and green) and their clusteringcoeﬃcients: Removing or altering one graph from the partitioned graph set only
aﬀects the numerator of one collection’s mean by one.

male-only dorms in the data-set. If N is publicly known (for instance, because each
university’s dorms are listed on their website) we can safely skip adding noise to this
value and focus on privatizing only the numerator M without reducing the privacy
of the result [59]. Since M is a sum of clustering coeﬃcients that have values in the
bounded range [0,1], adding, removing or altering one clustering coeﬃcient will alter
the sum M by at most 1. Thus the sensitivity of the sum M is 1, and the value
M +Lap(1/)
N

will be diﬀerentially private. Note that the noise added to the true values

of M aleDormsClustering has a standard deviation of only Lap(1/)/N .

5.2.2

Degree Distribution

Partition-privacy can also enable privatized analysis of degree distribution data.
Consider the context in which a researcher performs an experiment to directly study
behavior patterns in small social groups. A common technique is to assign people to
small groups where they must work cooperatively to solve problems [56, 57]. Interpersonal communications in each group are monitored and analyzed. Raw communication data can be transformed into social network graphs by adding edges between
nodes that communicate frequently. In small groups, diﬀerent degree distributions
will indicate diﬀerent patterns of cooperation; for example, groups may have one
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Fig. 5.2.: Removing or adding one graph only aﬀects the count in one histogram
category by one.

high-degree ’leader’ centralizing communication, or they might cooperate equitably
together producing a near clique graph (see Figure 5.2). These degree-distribution
categories may be aﬀected by the group’s context (e.g., working in person, or online),
and they may aﬀect the group’s performance on the assigned task. When degreedistributions help us attach a meaningful category label to individual networks, we
can use a privatized histogram to safely release the distribution of these labels across
the set of networks. If desired, we can further partition this histogram using properties such as the group’s context or performance score to create more informative
multi-dimensional histograms (for an example of a multi-dimensional histogram, see
Figure 5.3). As described in section 2.1, histograms have a sensitivity of only 1 and
may be safely released by adding Laplacian noise calibrated to that sensitivity to each
count.

5.2.3

Path-length Queries

A noteworthy property of partition-privacy is that it does not exhibit the high
sensitivity to path length queries that constrains other forms of graph privacy. Although removing a bridge will drastically aﬀect path lengths in a given network, it
will only aﬀect one network in the collection of small disjoint networks that comprises
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Fig. 5.3.: With a set of graphs, histograms can be used to release information about
the relationships between multiple variables, including path lengths, with low sensitivity.

the data-set for a partition-privacy application. This enables privatized analysis for
a wide variety of graph properties that are otherwise too revealing to be released.
The average shortest-path distance for a network is a measure of its connectedness. Given a collection of networks, we can ﬁnd the average shortest-path length
for each network and aggregate the results into a histogram, giving us information
about the patterns of graph-connectedness across our data-set (see Figure 5.3). As
the sensitivity of a histogram is just 1, the results can be privatized by adding a
relatively small amount of noise to each count. The same technique can be used
on any numerical or categorical graph property: we can privatize the distribution of
maximum centrality scores, number of bridges per graph, or even graph diameters.
This ﬂexibility of application is one of the primary advantages of partition-privacy.
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5.3

Utility Analysis
We note that, as in the previous chapter, the basic analysis algorithms proposed

above have low sensitivity. Thus, the general utility analysis presented in Section 4.3
applies to partition-private analysis tools as well as contributor-private tools, and we
direct the reader to the previous discussion. The empirical work in the subsequent
section demonstrates analysis utility for a diverse set of four analyses over three
moderately-sized sets of partitioned networks.

5.4

Practical Application
The partition-private analysis techniques described in this chapter have been de-

signed to minimize analysis sensitivity and output size, such that privacy can be
achieved with relatively little added noise. Additionally, partition-privacy itself provides a strong privacy guarantee, protecting entire subgraphs rather than solely nodes
or edges, while simultaneously enabling privatized implementations of analyses such
as community-detection and path-length metrics too sensitive to be performed under previous edge-privacy and node-privacy standards. To demonstrate the utility of
partition-private techniques we now perform an in-depth analysis set on three partitioned networks.
Through this analysis set, we will explore one interesting question: What happened to Friendster?

5.4.1

Data-Sets

We will investigate this question through the three network partition sets 1 , taken
from the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection [55]. These networks are available publicly online as anonymized edge and node sets and have been referenced in a
wide body of social network research. Because they have been previously published in
1

Where the original data was not a strict partition, we preprocessed the data by assigning nodes
that appeared in several groups to a single, randomly selected group in that set.
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simply-anonymized form, we will include both privatized and non-privatized analysis
results for comparison purposes.
For these experiments we work with partition sets taken from three large networks:
The DBLP online bibliography of publications in Computer Science, as well as two
online social networks (OSN)–LiveJournal and Friendster. Although LiveJournal lost
popularity in the United States in the mid-2000’s during the rise of Facebook, it continues to be in widespread use internationally. Friendster, by contrast, was dismantled
as social network in 2011 and continues today only as an online gaming website. The
Friendster partition set was collected near the end of the OSN’s lifespan. From each
network, we consider the largest 5000 ’ground-truth’ communities, deﬁned as follows:
Data-Sets: DBLP:
• Network: Extensive database of publications in Computer Science, including
authors and venues (conferences or journals). A network is drawn from this data
by including a node for each author appearing in the data-base and adding
edges between individuals who have appeared together as co-authors on the
same work. Edges in this network edges reﬂect real world collaboration eﬀorts.
• Groups: Ground-truth communities in this network are deﬁned by connected
networks of authors that have published in the same venue.
Friendster:
• Network: Online social network launched in 2002 which gathered over 8 million
users before being abandoned and ﬁnally dismantled in 2011. This network data
was collected shortly before the OSN was shut down. Nodes indicate members,
and edges between them indicate OSN friendships.
• Groups: Ground-truth communities in this network are user-deﬁned groups:
Friendster allowed members to create groups which other members could join.
The semantics of these groups is diverse: they might reﬂect broadly shared
interests or hobbies, or particular groups of friends.
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LiveJournal:
• Network: Online social network launched in 1999; current usage includes approximately 1.8 million active users and 39.6 million total accounts. Nodes
indicate members, and edges between them indicate OSN friendships.
• Groups: Ground-truth communities in this network are user-deﬁned groups:
LiveJournal allowed members to create groups which other members could join.
The semantics of these groups is diverse: they might reﬂect broadly shared
interests or hobbies, or particular groups of friends.

5.4.2

Privatized Analysis

We performed the following four analyses across each of the three networks. Each
analysis incurs a sensitivity cost of 1, producing a total sensitivity of 4; laplacian
noise suﬃcient to obfuscate this sensitivity was added to every output value. The
parameter  = ln(2) was used throughout this analysis. Distribution cut-oﬀs are
chosen independently of the data-set to ensure no additional sensitivity cost.
Analyses
• Average Shortest Path Distribution: We computed the average shortest
path (the mean of the set of distances computed between every pair of nodes
in the group) for each group in the network, and aggregated this data into
a distribution with a cut-oﬀ of 8. Recall from Chapter 3 that path-length
information is not generally privatizable under edge-privacy or node-privacy
standards; however, partition-privacy oﬀers a high-privacy and low-sensitivity
tool for studying these network properties. Smaller average shortest path values
indicate groups in which nodes are more tightly interconnected. Results for all
three networks are presented in Figure 5.4.
• Average Local Clustering Coeﬃcient Distribution: We computed the
average local clustering coeﬃcient (the mean of the set of LCC’s taken across
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all of the nodes in the group) for each group in the network, and aggregated this
data into a distribution with a precision of 0.1. Larger average local clustering
coeﬃcient values indicate groups with high transitivity: groups in which any
two friends of an individual are likely to also be friends with each other. These
groups tend to be more socially cohesive. Results for all three networks are
presented in Figure 5.5.
• Edge Density Distibution: We computed the edge density (the total number of edges in the group divided by the number of nodes; also known as the
’average degree’) for each group in the network, and aggregated this data into
a distribution with a cut-oﬀ of 30. Large edge density values indicate groups in
which nodes extend a greater number of edges to other individuals. Results for
all three networks are presented in Figure 5.6.
• Community Count Distribution: Using an implementation of the Louvain Community Detection method [60] (a popular modularity-based community detection method) provided in the community.py python library, we computed the number of independent (partitioned) community substructures in
each group. We then aggregated this data into a distribution with a cut-oﬀ of
150. Community-detection has not been previously achieved with node-privacy
in existing work, but partition-privacy provides a tool which allows us to study
this network property with very low sensitivity and a privacy guarantee that is
stronger than node-privacy. As with the schism visible in the Karate Graph,
well-deﬁned sub-communities existing within a larger group indicate the group
is less uniﬁed. Results for all three networks are presented in Figure 5.7.
In general, we can see that noise had relatively little visible eﬀect in the privatized
output for this analysis set; this is a result of the low sensitivity, constrained output
size, and the size of the data-sets (the number of partition groups from each network).
One exception is the community count distributions for the Friendster and, to a lesser
extent, the LiveJournal partition set (see Figure 5.7). Note that the scale of the y-
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axis, indicating the size of the plotted data, is reduced for these distribution: both
partition sets had a portion of groups with large and diverse community counts,
extending the tail of their distributions beyond the cut-oﬀ, and allowing the eﬀect of
the additive noise to be more signiﬁcant relative to the scale of the output counts.
One step to improve the level of detail available on the tails of these distributions
would be to increase ’bucket-widths’: reduce the granularity of the x-axis into ranges
of size 10 or 20. By increasing the size of the counts that fall into each range, this
would reduce the impact of noise addition (which is relative to the size of the data).
However, we will retain the original axes for comparison purposes in this analysis set.
Note that, although the Friendster distribution plot displays more noise, because the
noise is added independently to each output the underlying curve of the distribution
remains visible.

5.4.3

Conclusions

We now return to address our original question: In what ways does the Friendster
group partition set diﬀer from the more successful and longer lived networks?
We use privatized normalized distributions for comparison between networks, using the approach given in Deﬁnition 4.5 in the previous chapter.
Throughout these analysis results we see that the distributions from the longer
lived LiveJournal network bear a greater similarity to the real-world collaboration
DBLP network than the failed OSN Friendster.
In terms of average shortest path (see Figure 5.8), we see that both DBLP and
LiveJournal distributions have considerable weight on very small AvgSP lengths (11.2), while the Friendster distribution has its greatest weight at a longer path length
(1.5-1.6). This indicates that a majority of the Friendster groups were less tightly
connected than groups in the DBLP and LiveJournal networks. It’s interesting to note
that the DBLP distribution also had some weight at 1.5, in a bimodal distribution:
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(a) DBLP AvgSP Distribution

(b) DBLP privatization noise

(c) LiveJournal AvgSP Distribution

(d) LiveJournal privatization noise

(e) Friendster AvgSP Distribution

(f) Friendster privatization noise

Fig. 5.4.: Results of the partition-private average shortest path distributions for the
DBLP, LiveJournal and Friendster group networks
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(a) DBLP AvgLCC Distribution

(b) DBLP privatization noise

(c) LiveJournal AvgLCC Distribution

(d) LiveJournal privatization noise

(e) Friendster AvgLCC Distribution

(f) Friendster privatization noise

Fig. 5.5.: Results of the partition-private average local clustering coeﬃcient distributions for the DBLP, LiveJournal and Friendster group networks
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(a) DBLP Edge Density Distribution

(b) DBLP privatization noise

(c) LiveJournal Edge Density Distribution

(d) LiveJournal privatization noise

(e) Friendster Edge Density Distribution

(f) Friendster privatization noise

Fig. 5.6.: Results of the partition-private edge density distributions for the DBLP,
LiveJournal and Friendster group networks
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(a) DBLP CCnt Distribution

(b) DBLP privatization noise

(c) LiveJournal CCnt Distribution

(d) LiveJournal privatization noise

(e) Friendster CCnt Distribution

(f) Friendster privatization noise

Fig. 5.7.: Results of the partition-private community count distributions for the
DBLP, LiveJournal and Friendster group networks
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Fig. 5.8.: Comparison of normalized privatized average shortest path distributions.

this might represent the case in which a small number of distinct collaboration groups
at one venue are connected by one or two bridge nodes who work with both.
In terms of average LCC (see Figure 5.9), we see that both the DBLP and LiveJournal network distributions have most of their weight at high LCC values (0.8-1.0),
while the majority of groups in the Friendster network showed less transitivity, with
average LCC values in the 0.5-0.8 range. This implies that both the groups reﬂecting
the real world DBLP relationships and the groups reﬂecting online relationships in
LiveJournal tended to be more socially cohesive than the groups in Friendster.
In terms of edge-density (see Figure 5.10), we see that many groups in both
LiveJournal and DBLP had a less dense edge-set with peaks falling in the 1-5 average degree range (and a longer tail on the LiveJournal distribution). By contrast,
the Friendster network showed a bimodal distribution with considerable weight at a
higher edge density of 9-10. This is interesting in light of the fact that, although
groups in Friendster tended to have a greater edge-density, the previous distribution
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Fig. 5.9.: Comparison of normalized privatized average local clustering coeﬃcient
distributions.

Fig. 5.10.: Comparison of normalized privatized edge density distributions.
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indicates that they had less transitivity: these added edges weren’t necessarily forming cohesive friendship groups. Similarly, the average shortest path results indicate
that the additional edges in Friendster were not increasing the small-world property
of the network by bringing outlier nodes or poorly connected subgroups into better
connection with the network (and thus reducing path length).

Fig. 5.11.: Comparison of normalized privatized community count distributions.

In terms of community count (see Figure 5.11), we see similar peaks in all three
distributions, focused on the 5-15 range, with diﬀerent weights on those peaks vrs.
the tails of the distributions. The vast majority of the groups in the DBLP network
had fewer than ten subgroups, while the Friendster groups were much more likely
to have many (more than 20) distinct sub-communities. LiveJournal fell in between
these two distributions, with more weight falling in the 1-30 range. This indicates
less unity in the OSN’s, with groups in Friendster being especially divided (again,
despite having a greater edge density).
Overall, although this analysis set does not necessarily support causal inferences,
we can hypothesize from this evidence that by the time of its demise Friendster had
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begun to lack many of the properties that are inherent in real world social networks:
groups in Friendster had a glut of edges that did not form transitive communities,
did not tightly connect nodes within the group (reducing path length), and did not
unify groups (reducing the sub-community count). These edges would have had a
signiﬁcant presence in their members’ proﬁles without necessarily oﬀering the same
beneﬁts as real world relationships, acting more like random edges than social ties
into well-deﬁned communities. If time-series data were available, it might be very
informative to see how these properties evolved as the Friendster OSN declined.
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6. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
6.1

Introduction
The ability to perform statistical signiﬁcance testing is vital in real world social

science applications. In order to draw reliable inferences from data analysis results it
is necessary to distinguish between when an observed diﬀerence in two sampled data
distributions is the result of a fundamental diﬀerence in the two underlying random
variables being sampled, and when it is more likely the result of random sampling
error (or, in our case, added privatization noise).
We now consider one real world application of social network analysis–intervention
in organizational networks. An organization, such as a large corporation or university, may collect data on the relationships between their members, and use research
on the correlation between network properties and individal/organizational success
to determine the overall ’health’ of their network. For example, certain network properties have been shown to be signiﬁcant in predicting women’s ability to resist the
negative eﬀects of sexism in corporate environments [61], [62]. The organization’s
leadership may then introduce programs to address any observed concerns, such as
activities intended to foster tighter relationships or more diverse relationships among
organization members. And ﬁnally, a second network is collected over the same set of
individuals in order to determine the eﬀectiveness of the intervention program. This
produces two sets of sampled data over the same set of individuals, a ’before’ network
and an ’after’ network, or a ’paired-sample’ data-set.
In this chapter we present a diﬀerentially privatized approach to determining statistical signiﬁcance on paired-sample data, using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test [63].
In addition to being applicable to the paired-sample data generated by the network
interventions described above, this test is well-suited to social network analysis be-
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cause, unlike the widely-used Student’s T-test, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test does
not require the underlying data to have a normal distribution. As can be observed in
the empirical results of the preceding two chapters, social network data does not in
general produce a normal distribution.

6.2

Background: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test

Fig. 6.1.: Demonstration of the non-privatized Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test procedure

The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was proposed by Frank Wilcoxon in 1945 [64].
It takes as input a set of paired samples, generated by the same set of individuals
measured before and after the administration of a ’treatment’, and produces a statistic that can be used to determine whether the distribution after the treatment is
signiﬁcantly distinct from the distribution before treatment. The test assumes that
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the individuals included in the statistic are selected independently of each other, and
that the measure being studied is continuous rather than discrete.

6.2.1

Test Procedure

Given a set of N individuals i ∈ I and paired data samples (pi1 , pi2 ) for each
individual i, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test statistic is computed as follows [63] (see
Figure 6.1):
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Procedure
[1] The diﬀerence di = (pi2 − pi1 ) is computed for each individual i ∈ I
[2] All i with di = 0 are removed. The remaining non-zero diﬀerences comprise
a diﬀerence-set D. We use the notation NR = |D| to refer to the ’reduced N ’
size of the non-zero diﬀerence-set.
[3] The diﬀerence-set is sorted into increasing order by absolute value:
[d1 , d2 , d3 ...dNR ], such that i < j ⇒ |di | ≤ |dj |
[4] Ranks are assigned to values in the list of diﬀerences in increasing order such
that ri = rank(di ) = i (with one exception: If there exists a tie between two
diﬀerences, such that di = di+1 , both values are assigned the rank (i + i + 1)/2;
In general, in a tie of size k, di = d1+1 = ...di+k−1 all elements are assigned their
average rank k1 Σk−1
j.)
i
R
[5] The absolute value of the signed rank sum W = |Wraw | = |ΣN
1 sign(di ) ∗ ri |

is computed
[6] The denominator σ(NR ) =
[7] The test statistic Z =



W −0.5
σ(NR )

1
NR (NR +1)(2NR +1)
6

is computed

is computed

[8] If NR ≥ 10 the value Z is compared against a normal Zcrit table, otherwise
the value is compared against a table explicitly computed for ranked-sums. [63]
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6.3

Privatization

6.3.1

Computing Sensitivity

We now compute the function sensitivity of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test under
contributor-privacy, using a second-variant deﬁnition of neighboring worlds: ie, the
total number NR of individuals in the diﬀerence set is static, but the value di of a
single individual may vary arbitrarily among non-zero values (see Deﬁnition 2.1).
Theorem 6.1 The sensitivity of the statistic ZNR produced by the Wilcoxon SignedRank test with ﬁxed diﬀerence-set size NR is 2NR /σ(NR ) =



2NR
NR (NR +1)(2NR +1)
6

Proof: We alter the value of individual j as follows: (rj = v1 ) → (rj  = v2 ), for
v1 , v2 = 0. When the value of j is altered such that its signed rank rj changes from v1
to v2 , the value of the raw rank sum (before the absolute value) changes by (v2 − v1 ).
Because the number of non-zero diﬀerences (NR ) has not been altered, the value of
the denominator σ(NR ) remains unchanged. WLOG, the change in the numerator is
maximized for v1 = −NR , v2 = NR (j is changed from the greatest positive diﬀerence
value to the greatest negative diﬀerence value).
Note that:
W −0.5+2NR
σ(NR )

=

W −0.5
σ(NR )

+

2NR
σ(NR )

= Z NR +

2NR
σ(NR )

Thus the total change to the statistic ZNR is

2NR
.
σ(NR )

Sensitivity:ΔZNR = 2NR /σ(NR )
Given this sensitivity as a function of NR , we note the following useful fact:
Corollary 6.2 Laplacian privatization noise generated with parameter

2NR1
,
σ(NR1 )

which

is suﬃcient to privatize a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test(WSRT) statistic ZNR1 with
diﬀerence-set size NR1 , will also be suﬃcient to privatize any WSRT statistic ZNR2
with a larger diﬀerence-set size NR2 > NR1 .
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Proof: We’ll show that NR2 > NR1 implies that ΔZNR2 ≤ ΔZNR1 , and thus noise
added to privatize ZNR1 will be more than enough to privatize ZNR2 :
2(NR +k)
2NR
≥ σ(N
σ(NR )
R +k)
2NR σ(NR +k)
2(NR +k)σ(NR )
≥ σ(N
σ(NR )σ(NR +k)
R +k)σ(NR )

2NR σ(NR + k) ≥ 2(NR + k)σ(NR )


(NR )(NR +1)(2NR +1)
R +2k+1)
2NR (NR +k)(NR +k+1)(2N
≥
2(N
+
k)
R
6
6
√
√ 2
4NR (NR +k)(NR +k+1)(2NR +2k+1)
4(NR +k)2 (NR )(NR +1)(2NR +1)
√
√
≥
6
6
√
√ 2
2
4NR (NR +k)(NR +k+1)(2NR +2k+1)
4(NR +k) NR (NR +1)(2NR +1)
≥
1
1
4NR2 (NR + k)(NR + k + 1)(2NR + 2k + 1) ≥ 4(NR + k)2 (NR )(NR + 1)(2NR + 1)
NR (NR + k + 1)(2NR + 2k + 1) ≥ (NR + k)(NR + 1)(2NR + 1)
(NR2 + NR (k + 1))(2NR + 2k + 1) ≥ (NR2 + (k + 1)NR + k)(2NR + 1)
2NR3 + 2(k + 1)NR2 + (2k + 1)NR2 + (2k + 1)(k + 1)NR ≥ 2NR3 + 2(k + 1)NR2 + 2kNR +
NR2 + (k + 1)NR + k
2(k+1)NR2 +(2k+1)NR2 +(2k+1)(k+1)NR ≥ 2(k+1)NR2 +NR2 +2kNR +(k+1)NR +k
(4k + 3)NR2 + (2k + 1)(k + 1)NR ≥ (2k + 3)NR2 + (3k + 1)NR + k
2kNR2 + (2k 2 + 3k + 1)NR ≥ (3k + 1)NR + k
2kNR2 + 2k 2 NR ≥ k
2kNR2 + 2k 2 NR − k ≥ 0
2NR2 + 2kNR − 1 ≥ 0
2NR2 + 2kNR ≥ 1
Which clearly holds for k, NR ≥ 1
We now address the fact that this sensitivity is a function of NR , the number of
people who were aﬀected by the treatment in some fashion (either large or small,
positive or negative) by the treatment. The value NR itself may be sensitive information that cannot be published or used as a parameter in privatized analysis. The
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test assumes data sets with continuous values in which very
small diﬀerence values may be common, but zeros are relatively rare (similar to the
hypothetical data in Figure 6.1). Social network statistics such as local clustering
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coeﬃcients, or an individual’s average edge strength over homophilous links

1

(e.g.,

characterized in terms of amount of email exchanged, or number of meetings), produce this type of continuous data-set. In these continuous data-sets, small levels
of variation are common and the fact that di > 0 may not constitute particularly
privacy-invasive information about i: this fact does not reveal either the size or the
sign of di , leaving the possibility that di is very small and due to random ﬂuctuations
rather than any speciﬁc reaction to the treatment. We provide a High-Utility variant
of our Privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test that assumes limited information about
NR can safely be made public.
However, in high privacy-risk contexts NR may be a sensitive value that requires
protection. For example, a set of average edge weights in a sexual-interaction network,
taken before and after a sexual education class, would require careful privacy protection. We also provide a High-Privacy variant of our privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test that controls disclosure about NR . Importantly, although they may produce false
negatives on smaller data-sets or when privatizing lower signiﬁcance values, neither
technique introduces new (unaccounted for) false positives into the privatized significance testing results.
Two Variants of the Privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
• High Utility: This privatization procedure assumes that data-owners are comfortable publishing this statement: ”Our data-set contains at least N > 30
individuals, and if more than 30% of our data-set shows precisely zero
reaction to the treatment, we will assume the treatment eﬀect was
insigniﬁcant and will not publish our results.” The privatized analysis assumes NR ≥ 0.3N , computes the non-privatized statistic Z, and adds laplacian
noise accordingly (see Theorem 6.1) to satisfy diﬀerential privacy.
• High Privacy: This privatization procedure assumes that data-owners are
not comfortable publishing any information regarding NR . The privatization
1

The strength of a woman’s network connections to other women has been shown to predict career
success for women in corporate organizations. [61]
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scheme obfuscates the true value of NR by ﬁrst ’priming’ the diﬀerence set
with 2k synthetic values, to ensure a minimum value of NR . Laplacian noise
suﬃcient to obfuscate a statistic with NR ≥ 2k is then added (see Theorem
6.1), satisfying diﬀerential privacy. This approach is explained in detail in the
next section.

6.3.2

Priming D for High-Risk Applications

In cases where privacy risk is high, we provide a method for ensuring a known
minimum value of NR without revealing any information about the true original
value of NR . Intuitively, this requires ’priming’ the diﬀerence set by a inserting a
small amount of synthetic data into the diﬀerence-set before beginning the Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Test procedure. Given a data-set with diﬀerence-set D of size NR , we
take the following steps to prime D with 2k initial values:
Priming Procedure
[1] Because D is ﬁnite, there exists a number  such that  > di , ∀i. (The
actual value of this number is not signiﬁcant, so no privacy leaks are induced
by this observation).
[2] Create a new diﬀerence-set D by adding to D: k values of size  and k
values of size −.
[3] Compute the statistic Z  over the primed D . Note that NR > 2k +NR > 2k
[4] It is now possible, by Corollary 6.2, to privatize Z  by adding laplacian noise
suﬃcient for sensitivity 2(2k)/σ(2k) without needing to know the true value of
NR .
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We now consider the eﬀect priming has on the value of the test statistic Z.
Lemma 6.3 Priming does not alter the value of the signed rank-sum W
Proof: Note that the priming −,  values, which form a tie of size 2k, will
all be assigned the same rank: r = (NR + 2k)/2k. Because they are at the top of
the ranking, their inclusion will not alter the rankings for any of the diﬀerences in
the original diﬀerence-set 2 . And because the two groups of k priming values have
opposing signs, they cancel each other out in the sum: kr + −kr = 0, producing no
eﬀect on the signed rank-sum W .
Given this result, it is trivial to show that priming does not introduce false positives in statistical signiﬁcance tests:
Theorem 6.4 Priming does not increase the value of test statistic Z, and thus does
not introduce false positives (which appear signiﬁcant when the original statistic was
not large enough to be signiﬁcant):
Proof: Using Lemma 6.3, we see that priming does not alter the numerator (W −
0.5) of Z. Priming does however, increase the value of the denominator, as σ(NR +
2k) > σ(NR ). This decreases the value of the test statistic. Test statistics which show
signiﬁcance with priming will show signiﬁcance without priming.
Although priming does not introduce false positives, it may cause false negatives:
test values which would have appeared just above the signiﬁcance threshold but which
were reduced below the threshold by the eﬀect of priming (increasing denominator of
the statistic). This reduction in detail is a natural consequence of the high-privacy
context. However, we note that the eﬀect diminishes as the data-set increases: the
impact of priming on the value of the test statistic goes to zero as the size of the
diﬀerence-set goes to inﬁnity.
2
Inserting an element into the bottom of the diﬀerence set naturally increases the rank of all the
other, larger elements by 1
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−0.5
Theorem 6.5 limNR →inf [ W
−
σ(NR )

W −0.5
σ(NR +2k)

= 0]

Proof:
−0.5
limNR →inf [ W
−
σ(NR )

W −0.5
]
σ(NR +2k)

=

limNR →inf [(W − 0.5)( σ(N1 R ) −

1
)]
σ(NR +2k)

=

limNR →inf [(W − 0.5)] ∗ [limNR →inf ( σ(N1 R ) ) − limNR →inf ( σ(NR1+2k) )] =
limNR →inf [(W − 0.5)] ∗ [0 − 0] =
limNR →inf [(W − 0.5)] ∗ 0 = 0

6.3.3

Recalibrating the Critical Value Table

Now we address the critical value table. In a non-privatized context, this table is
used to determine whether a given test statistic value is suﬃciently large to indicate
a fundamental diﬀerence in the distributions being compared, rather than spurious
sampling error. For values of NR > 10, the WSRT statistic can be compared against
the same critical value table that belongs to the more widely-used T-Test over normal
distributions (see Figure 6.3). However, in addition to sampling error, we will now
need to account for error introduced by our privatization noise. We will modify the
critical value table such that added noise does not introduce unexpected false-positives
(statistics which appear signiﬁcant solely due to the eﬀect of added privatization
noise).
For simplicity, we will use  = 1 as our privacy parameter for the remainder of
this chapter. We begin by deriving the following two results relevant to recalibrating
the critical value table.

111
Lemma 6.6 Given a positive privatized value X, which was privatized by the addition
of noise taken from the laplacian(W ) distribution: The probability that the true value
V , before noise addition, was greater or equal to positive threshold T is: (1/2)e

X−T
W

.

Proof: Note that: X = V + noise(W ), and thus if noise(W ) < (X − T ), then
V > T . The CDF for the Laplacian Distribution is: (1/2)e

x−μ
b

. Plugging in the

appropriate values (μ = 0, b = W, x = (X − T )) gives the desired result.
Theorem 6.7 Given a privatized test statistic X such that: (1) There is a t% chance
that the true, original value Z was greater than T , and (2) There is a p% chance that
a value of T or greater indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two distributions
being tested, then the total probability that X indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the two distributions is p% × t%.

Proof: This follows trivially from the laws of probability: given two independent
events A, B: P (A ∧ B) = P (A)P (B)
Given Theorem 6.7 and Lemma 6.6, we can now alter the critical value table to take
added privatization noise into account (see Figure 6.2). Recall that the magnitude
of noise added to the WSRT statistic is dependent on the size of the diﬀerence-set.
Following Lemma 6.6 we compute for each NR a 99% eﬀective upper-bound for noise
2NR
values sampled according to a laplacian distribution with parameter ( σ(N
); with
R)

99% probability the added noise at these values of NR will have magnitude smaller
than these upper-bounds. We then modify both the a values and the Zcrit thresholds
in the the traditional critical value table (Figure 6.3) to take into account the eﬀect
of this added noise, according to Theorem 6.7.
The revised table is used as follows: The diﬀerence-set minimum size indexes the
rows, and the probability of signiﬁcance (revised a-values) indexes the columns. For
a given diﬀerence-set of size equal to or larger than NR (with noise added based on a
sensitivity of NR or larger), and signiﬁcance probability 1 − a, the value in location
(NR , a) gives appropriate revised Zcrit value.
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Fig. 6.2.: Recalibrated critical value table. For each of the given NR−min values, the
99%-eﬀective upper bound for sampled noise values is listed, along with adjusted a
values (for both directed and undirected hypotheses) and Zcrit thresholds.

Fig. 6.3.: Original (non-privatized) Critical Value Table

6.3.4

Complete Algorithm

We now summarize the complete privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test procedure
as described in the previous sections.
[1a] High-Privacy Prime the diﬀerence-set with 2k values to achieve a minimum diﬀerence-set size NR ≥ NR−min = 2k (see Section 6.3.2).
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[1b] High-Utility Assert that at least 30% of the data-set of size N has nonzero diﬀerence values, producing a minimum diﬀerence-set size NR ≥ NR−min >
.3N
[2] Compute the true Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistic Z (see the procedure in
Section 6.2.1).
2NR−min
[3] Sample a noise value from the laplacian( σ(2N
) distribution, and add
R−min )

this to Z (this assumes  = 1). This produces a publishable value Zpriv =
Z + noise.
[4] Compare the resulting privatized statistic Zpriv for signiﬁcance, against the
revised Zcrit table (see Figure 6.2).

6.4

Practical Application
Finally, we demonstrate the application of the privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank

Test to several queries over the New York City Taxi Data-set [65]. This simplyanonymized data-set was originally collected in 2013 and contains very detailed information including, for every cab driver, a log of all trips: trip origin, destination,
date, time, fare, number of passengers, distance, and tips. The data-set was publicly
released as the result of a Freedom Of Information Law request in 2014, and has
been shown to be extremely susceptible to de-anonymization attacks [66]. However,
because this data-set has already been made publicly available, we will include both
privatized and non-privatized results for comparison purposes.
To demonstrate the need for a privatized statistical signiﬁcance test, in cases where
underlying patterns in the data may not be self-evident, we also include privatized
means for each of the three queries. Under variant 2 sensitivity (with ﬁxed N ), a
diﬀerentially privatized mean may be computed as follows:
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Deﬁnition 6.8 Privatized Average: Given a data-set D = {di } of size n, with
upper bound b (such that di ≤ b∀i), we deﬁne the privatized average (under neighboring world variant two) as:
Avgpriv = (

6.4.1

1
laplacian(b/)
di ) +
n
n

Data-set

We look at two days from the data-set, January 1st (New Years Day, including
trips taken after midnight on New Years Eve) and January 2nd (a Wednesday). A
total of 17,069 cab drivers drove on both of these days. For the cab drivers in our
data-set we consider how three pieces of data diﬀer between these days:
Queries (Change comparison from 1/1/2013 to 1/2/2013)
• Car-pooling: Average number of passengers per trip
• Duration: Average time per trip (in seconds)
• Distance: Average distance per trip (in miles)
We will protect the privacy of the cab-drivers whose data was contributed to the
set. Note that although this data-set was originally presented in tabular form, it
has a natural network interpretation as a graph of cab trips (multi-edges) between
locations (nodes) in New York City. In this interpretation, the data contributed by
each cab driver forms a subgraph of the network, consisting of the trips taken by that
driver. The queries we consider above reference edge-properties in this graph.
To demonstrate the impact of data-set size on privatization and signiﬁcance estimation, we will run each query over a small data set consisting of 100 drivers, and a
large data-set consisting of 1000 drivers. Figure 6.4 shows the raw diﬀerence-set data
for our three queries across the two data-set sizes.
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(a) 100 Cabs Passenger Data

(b) 1000 Cabs Passenger Data

(c) 100 Cabs Time Data

(d) 1000 Cabs Time Data

(e) 100 Cabs Distance Data

(f) 1000 Cabs Distance Data

Fig. 6.4.: Sorted raw distance-sets for each of our three queries. Without statistical
analysis, it is diﬃcult to draw meaningful conclusions about this data.

6.4.2

Privatized Analysis

For each query and each data-set size, we computed the following statistics:
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Statistics
• True mean of the diﬀerence-set
• Privatized mean of the diﬀerence-set
• True Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test statistic Z
• Privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test statistic (stating NR ≥ .3N )
• Primed, Privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test statistic (using a priming set of
size 2 × 15 to produce NR ≥ 30)
For a signiﬁcance threshold, we used a = .02 for the non-privatized statistics, and
a = 0.0199 (from the recalibrated signiﬁcance table, Figure 6.2) for the privatized
values, placing a very slightly more rigorous requirement on the privatized computations. Results can be seen in Figure 6.5 with signiﬁcant statistics highlighted in
red.
In this analysis set, each query was computed independently, without summing
total sensitivity as in the previous chapters; in practice, publishing this complete
analysis set would provide reduced /6 protection for each individual cab driver.
However, there is an alternative: In this context it is possible to run each query over
a distinct (disjoint) sample of cab drivers, such that no cab driver contributes to more
than one analysis. Our total analysis set requires data from 3,300 cab drivers, while
our data-set over these two days contains over 17,000 cab drivers, allowing space for
further analyses if desired, without increasing sensitivity.
We are using  = 1 for simplicity of calculation. This is slightly larger than our
previous default value of  = ln(2), and thus will provide a slightly weaker privacy
guarantee (see Deﬁnition 2.2).

6.4.3

Discussion of Results

First, we note that the mean diﬀerence values (both privatized and non) are not
very informative. The largest mean diﬀerence occurs in the duration query (with
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(a) Results for Car-pooling Query (average number of passengers/car)

(b) Results for Time per Trip Query

(c) Results for Distance per Trip Query

Fig. 6.5.: Results of the statistical analysis for our three queries. Highlighted values
indicate signiﬁcance.

drivers on January 2nd having, on average, average trip durations 30 seconds shorter
than they experienced on January 1st). However, the distributions for the two dates
are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. By contrast, the car-pooling query has a
very small mean diﬀerence value, but a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the distributions
overall. Recall that mean computations may be inﬂuenced by a few large outlying
values that are not characteristic of the underlying distribution; this eﬀect is negated
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by the signed-rank sum strategy used in the WRST. Privatized means cannot replace
the functionality of privatized statistical signiﬁcance tests.
Returning to the signiﬁcance results themselves, we see clear evidence of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in car-pooling across the two dates: Individuals were more likely
to share a cab on New Years Day (and returning home after midnight, from celebrations on New Years Eve). This seems reasonably intuitive: friends might share a
cab home after a party or event; tourists might share a cab to the airport as they
return home on New Year’s Day. We see that privatization noise does not eﬀect
the signiﬁcance computation in this case. For the analyses with NR−min = 30 (the
high-utility small data-set and the two high-privacy sets) the critical threshold for
undirected hypotheses with a = 0.0199 is 3.006. For the large high-utility data-set,
which has NR−min = .3 × 1000 = 300, the signiﬁcance threshold is . Both the primed
and non-primed privatized analyses show signiﬁcance on both sizes of data-set.
By contrast, we see that the duration of trips did not vary signiﬁcantly between
the two dates (possibly reﬂecting similar traﬃc conditions). Due to the very small
Z value, the eﬀect of priming, and negative added noise–the smaller primed statistic
has a negative value: this can be set as zero before public release of the results, to
reduce confusion.
Finally, the results pertaining to distance are interesting. We do not see a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in distances on the smaller data-set, but the larger data-set oﬀers
enough detail to see a small signiﬁcant diﬀerence: the true statistic falls above the
2.326 threshold necessary to indicate signiﬁcance for an undirected hypothesis with
a = 0.02, and the high-utility privatized statistic falls just above the threshold for
NR−min = 300, which is 2.716. However, the high-privacy statistic, with a smaller
NR−min = 30 does not fall above its critical threshold 3.006. This is an example of
the higher-privacy context introducing a false negative result. On large data-sets, the
choice of a somewhat larger priming set will increase NR−min and reduce the magnitude of added noise; this will reduce the likelihood of false negatives somewhat.

119
However, the privatized WSRT should not be used for conclusively accepting the
null-hypothesis when results are near the signiﬁcance threshold.
In general, the privatized Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test provides both a robust
privacy guarantee and a robust statistical analysis tool: privatized results which have
been shown to be signiﬁcant are as trustworthy as the original, non-privatized results.
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7. DE FACTO PRIVACY
7.1

Introduction
The primary objective of privacy-preserving data mining is to untangle aggregate

facts about a population of interest from speciﬁc, sensitive facts attached to particular
individuals. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we demonstrated three factors that eﬀect
diﬀerentially private data-mining with Laplacian noise: the sensitivity of the function,
the size of the output data-structure, and the size of the data-set. We showed that
given a low sensitivity function, a small output space, and a large amount of data,
the eﬀect of the noise was nearly undetectable. This begs the question of whether
noise addition is necessary at all in these conditions.
We note that added noise is not necessarily the only factor obfuscating a target
individual’s sensitive contribution to a data-set. Consider the following example:
A survey on bullying is distributed to students at a school; it is then aggregated
into a count of the number of students who reported having been victimized by
bullying, and the total count is posted on a school bulletin board to draw attention
to the problem. This count does not satisfy diﬀerential privacy: given (n + 1) total
students, an attacker who knows with certainty the responses for n students will be
able to accurately determine the response for the (n + 1)th student. However, for a
given data-set and aggregation, we want to formally understand how much outside
information about the data-set is required for an attacker to feel conﬁdent that he
will be able to learn the data-value of an unknown individual. We will assume a
very strong attacker who has at least some knowledge (either certain or guessed)
about every individual in the data-set with the exception of a single unknown target
person. We are interested in the attacker’s beliefs about his own chances of success in
uncovering the truth about this unknown person. Our goal is to develop a metric to
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measure the relative level of ’De Facto Privacy’ provided by commonly-used ad-hoc
privacy protections such as simple deterministic aggregation.

7.2

Motivating Exmples

Fig. 7.1.: An example of a simple Yes—No survey

Returning to our bullying survey (see Figure 7.1), assume our attacker is familiar with the students in the school and so, with exception of the target individual,
the attacker has a series of guesses about the students’ likely responses. He is using
”outside knowledge” and has not seen the actual submitted survey papers. He does
not have certainty: it’s possible that a bullied student lied on the survey, or that an
apparently safe student is experiencing bullying where the attacker does not witness
it. The attacker believes his guesses are true with probability pcorrect = 0.9. He
imagines a scenario where the published totals are: bullied = [6], nonbullied = [15].
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It appears, from his guesses, that the target individual has been bullied. But, there
is another possible explanation for these totals: the target individual was not bullied, and instead an individual the attacker had guessed was safe was instead bullied.
This alternate scenario produces output identical to the scenario in which the target
individual is bullied, and by the attacker’s own estimation, it will occur with proba[N −1]

bility [numberof nonbullied] × pcorrect (1 − pcorrect ). In our hypothetical example, that
amounts to: 15 × (0.9)1 9(0.1) ≈ 0.20, (which we can compare to the 0.92 0 ≈ 0.12
chance that all of the attackers guesses were correct.)
Similarly, the attacker might imagine the complementary scenario, in which the
published totals are: bullied = [5], nonbullied = [16], and the target individual appears not to be bullied. However, an alternate explanation is that the target individual was, in fact bullied, and a bullied individual lied on their survey. The attacker
[N −1]

believes this will occur with probability [number of Bullied] ×pcorrect (1 − pcorrect )
= 5 × (0.9)1 9(0.1) = .07. Because the bullied set is smaller than the nonbullied set,
the attacker believes a mistake in this scenario is less likely than in the previous
scenario. So, of the two possible mistakes, [Target appears Bullied → Target is Nonbullied] and [Target appears Nonbullied → Target is Bullied], the least likely mistake
has probability .07 relative to a fully correct guess. In general, the probability of mis[N −1]

take [Target appears X → Target is Y] is [number of X] ×pcorrect (1 − pcorrect )/pN
correct
relative to a fully correct guess.
We can see the eﬀect of one of our privacy factors in these results: as the data
set size increases, and the number of students in both the Bullied and Nonbullied
categories increases, the probability of a mistake increases. With a very large dataset an attacker will have very little conﬁdence in his inference about the target. We
will consider one more illustrative example before formally introducing our model.
We now increase the output size of the query from two disjoint counts to four disjoint counts. A very sensitive survey collects information about high school students’
experiences with two facets of the traditional trio: Sex and Drugs 1 (see Figure 7.2).
1

Enjoying Rock-n-Roll music is not as sensitive as it once was.
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The data submitted by each individual student falls into one of four categories: Sex,
Drugs, Both(Sex And Drugs) or N either. Our ﬁrst aggregation scheme over this
data simply publishes the total counts for each of these four categories. Again, our attacker has a guess for the true value of each student, which he believes to be accurate
with probability pcorrect = 0.9. When his guess for a student’s data value is incorrect,
we make the simplifying assumption that the attacker believes all alternative values
are equally probable (if the attacker guesses that categoryJ = Sex, then the attacker
believes with probability 0.9 that categoryJ = Sex, and with probability (0.1)(1/3)
that categoryJ = N either, or categoryJ = Both, or categoryJ = Drugs).
There are four possible scenarios when the data is published–the target might
appear to be in each of the four categories. However, again, there are possible alternate explanations: For example, if the target appears to be in the Both category,
it’s possible that the target was actually in the N either category, and an individual
the attacker guessed was in the N either category was, in truth, quietly in the Both
category. The attacker estimates the probability of a [Target appears Both → Target
is Neither] mistake to be [Number of People in Neither ]×(0.9)n−1 (.01)(1/3) ≈ 0.04].
In our example, this comes to ≈ 0.04/.12 relative to the probability of a fully correct
guess.
There are 4×3 = 12 total possible swapping mistakes, across all four data publishing scenarios. The least likely mistake, [Target appears X → Target is Both], produces
a 3×(0.9)n−1 (.01)(1/3) ≈ .01 probability for a mistake, relative to the probability of a
fully correct guess. In general, [Target appears X → Target is Y] mistakes occur with
probability [size of category Y] ×(0.9)n−1 (.01)(1/3)/(0.9n ) , relative to the probability
of a fully correct guess.
Here we see the impact of another privacy factor, a larger output space. This reduces the attacker’s estimated likelihood of any particular mistake by increasing the
number of possible alternative categories (introducing the (1/3) factor in the analyses above). It also spreads the data across more categories, reducing the number of
individuals in each category (and thus reducing the probability of any guessing-error
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Fig. 7.2.: An example of a simple two question survey

that involves those categories). A data-set with very many categories and few individuals will tend to have many singleton categories, consisting of uniquely identiﬁable
individuals, and will have many very low-probability mistakes.
In the two previous examples, a mistake of type [Target appears X → Target
is Y, requires that the attacker’s guess was incorrect such that [G was guessed Y
→ G is X]. In other words, the target must swap places with an incorrectly guessed
person. To compute the probability of the mistake, we compute the probability of the
complementary incorrect guess. We’ll refer to the publication schema demonstrated in
these two examples as radio-button schemas, adopting the terminology from webform
interfaces: individuals answering a radio-button question can choose precisely one
option. By contrast, individuals answering a check-box question can check as many
options as they like, or no options at all. We next discuss a check-box schema.
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For the second publication scheme on this data, we will reduce the output size
by de-linking individual student’s responses for the two queries, Sex and Drugs; this
produces two counts totaling the number of people who responded Sex and the number
of people who responded Drugs. This is a check-box publication scheme: Individuals
in the category ’Both’ will check both boxes and contribute to both counts, and
individuals in the category ’Neither’ will check no boxes and contribute to neither
count.
We now consider the eﬀect of this change on our mistake probability computations.
For the mistake [Target appears Neither → Target is Both, there is the swapping
explanation we saw previously: [G was guessed Both → G is Neither]. However,
there are now additional possible guess-errors that may account for the attacker’s
guess having miscounted one extra D and S. For example: [G1 was guessed D and
G2 was guessed S, → G1 and G2 are Neither], and [G1 and G2 were guessed Both, →
G1 is S and G2 is D]. Because these additional guess-error explanations each have
non-zero probability, the total probability for any [Target appears X → Target is Y]
mistake in the check-box schema is greater than or equal to the probability for the
same mistake in the radio-button schema over the same raw data-set.

7.3

Defacto Privacy Metric
We now have suﬃcient background to introduce our formal model and derive a

useful set of theoretical results.

7.3.1

Framework

We begin with a raw data set, which we will represent as the data collected over a
set of individuals I using a series of questions Q, such that question qj has aj possible
answer values. Note that it is possible to expand this question set into k = Σj aj
binary questions of the form: ”Did the individual choose answer aj,l to question qj :
(Y/N)?” Considering the complete response submitted by one individual to the k
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binary questions, we can see that there are a total of at most 2k possible data values
that an individual might have, or 2k possible categories of individuals. We note that
if |I| < 2k , at least one category must be empty. Categories which represent invalid
of response-sets to binary questions (for instance, answering ”Yes” to two mutually
exclusive questions such as ”GPA = A: (Y/N)”? and ”GPA = B: (Y/N)?”) will also
be empty. In general, we will not attempt to distinguish these two cases, implicitly
assuming that empty categories represent values of either zero or negligible likelihood.
For all but one individual in I, the attacker has ”guessed” a category value
(guessed(i) = categoryj )2 These guesses form a guess-set G. The attacker believes
each of his guesses to be true with probability pcorrect . If an individual is guessed to
be guessed(i) = categoryj , then for every other categoryx = categoryj the attacker
believes guessed(i) = categoryx with equal probability

(1−pcorrect )
.
2k−1

For the target

individual, the attacker has no information.
In addition to his guesses G, the attacker has access to the published information
about the raw data-set. This published information is deterministic; it reﬂects the
true data-set with no added noise. We refer to the format of the published information
as a publication schema, S.
Intuitively, we want to measure the attacker’s relative self-conﬁdence about his
ability to correctly infer categorytarget , given guess-set G and schema S, assuming
the best-case scenario for the published information: the published information does
not contradict the hypothesis that all of the attacker’s guesses are correct, so that
the target’s value appears to be the diﬀerence between the published data and the
guessed values. Schemas that provide better privacy will decrease the attacker’s selfconﬁdence, even in this best-case scenario.
We emphasize that we are not claiming to provide a computation of the attacker’s
true probability of correctly inferring a target individual’s data value (in deterministic settings, we feel that this is dependent on an infeasible number of contextual
2
In a realistic scenario, it is possible the attacker knows the true values of some portion of the
data-set with absolute certainty, because he has been able to get partial access to the true data-set.
WLOG, we assume that I is the portion of the data set which is not known with certainty.
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factors). Instead, we hope to provide a useful abstraction for characterizing the ways
in which publication schemas work to magnify uncertainty. This can be used to make
a well-founded comparison of the relative privacy provided by diﬀerent publication
schemas, and it can provide a mathematical framework for more formally understanding common intuitive notions about privacy.
We mathematically abstract the attacker’s fear of his own fallibility as follows:
Given his guesses G, and a hypothetical set of published information in which the
target appears to have value categoryt , the attacker considers mistakes of the form
[Target appears X → Target is Y]. For any hypothetical set of published information,
there are 2k−1 possible mistakes, producing a total of 2k × (2k−1 ) possible mistakes
total over all possible cases (we refer to this as the mistake-set, M ). We compute the
probability of a mistake as the combined probability of possible simple guess-errors
which could cause the mistake to occur. To normalize for data-set size, we consider
the probability of a mistake relative to the probability of a fully correct guess-set,
(pN
correct ). Note that the probability of a fully correct guess-set is constant for a given
data-set, the probability of a mistake is dependent on the guessed distribution of
the data across the possible categories (G), the size of the question set (k), and the
publication schema (S).

Schemas
In this chapter we will consider two basic publication schemas:
Deﬁnition 7.1 Radio-Button Schema: A Radio-Button Schema publishes information about the data-set by listing the total counts in each of the 2k possible categories
that have non-zero counts (note that if the data-set does not include individual names,
this is functionally equivalent to publishing a simply-anonymized data-set).
Deﬁnition 7.2 Check-Box Schema: A Check-Box Publication Schema publishes
information about the data-set by listing the total counts for each of the k binary
questions. One individual can aﬀect up to k of these counts.
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7.3.2

Theoretical Results

We now present a series of theoretical results regarding radio-button and checkbox schemas. We begin with a formal summary of several facts about Radio-Button
schemas that were observed in our motivating examples. We consider the eﬀect of
the schema on the probability of every mistake in the mistake-set M (all 2k × (2k−1 )
mistakes of the form [Target appears X → Target is Y] ).
Theorem 7.3 In the Radio-Button schema, the probability of mistake [Target ap1
pears X → Target is Y] is |categoryY | × (pcorrect )n−1 (.01)( 2k−1
)

Proof: In the Radio-Button schema, a mistake [Target appears X → Target is Y]
requires a guessing-error [Target guessed Y → Target is X]. This error requires one incorrect guess in categoryY and correct answers for the remainder of the data-set. The
probability of an incorrect guess in categoryY is |categoryY |×(pcorrect )n−1 (.01), and the
probability that the incorrectly guessed person is actually in categoryX is

1
.
2k−1

Thus

1
the total probability of this mistake is as stated, |categoryY | × (pcorrect )n−1 (.01)( 2k−1
)

Corollary 7.4 In the Radio-Button Schema, increasing the size of the data-set will
monotonically increase the probability of the mistakes in M (if |I1 | ≥ |I2 |, then
∀minM , prob(m|I1 ) ≥ prob(m|I2 ) )

Proof: Adding any individual i to the data-set will increase the size of
categoryguessed(i) . This will increase the probability of mistakes of the form [Target
appears X → Target is categoryguessed(i) ]. Because adding an individual will not decrease the size of any category and will not increase the number of binary questions,
it will not decrease the probability of any mistake. By induction, adding any set of individuals {i} will monotonically increase the probability of mistakes in M as described.
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Theorem 7.5 In the Radio-Button Schema, increasing the number of binary questions (by adding either additional questions or additional possible answer values) will
decrease both the average probability of mistakes in M .

Proof: Increasing the value of k by 1 by including the question: ”Does i have
property A (T/F)?”, will have the eﬀect of splitting each mistake [Target appears X
→ Target is Y] into four cases: [Target appears XT → Target is YT ], [Target appears
XT → Target is YF ], [Target appears XF → Target is YT ], and [Target appears XF →
Target is YF ].
Note that |categoryY | = |categoryYF | + |categoryYT |, and thus |categoryYF | ≤
|categoryY | and |categoryYF | ≤ |categoryY |. We simplify notation by deﬁning
1
probError(n, k) = (pcorrect )n−1 (.01)( 2(k+1)−1
). Note that probError(n, (k + 1)) =

(1/2)probError(n, k).
Thus, the probability of any mistake in our new set of four mistakes (for example, [Target appears XT → Target is YF ], whose probability is |categoryYF | ×
probError(n, k + 1)) will be less than or equal to the probability of our original mistake |categoryY | × probError(n, k), with equality holding only when |categoryY | = 0.
And the average probability of these four mistakes will necessarily be smaller than the
probability of the original mistake. Expanding the result over the entire mistake set,
we see that if the data-set is non-empty, then the overall average mistake probability
is decreased by the addition of any binary question, and by induction any increase to
the question-set will decrease the average mistake probability.

3

We now look at the relationship between the Check-Box schema and the RadioButton schema.
Theorem 7.6 For each mistake m ∈ M , a Check-Box schema will produce a mistake
probability greater than or equal to that produced by a Radio-Button schema over the
same data-set.
3

Interestingly, it can be shown that the sum of the the probabilities in the mistake-set is unchanged
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Proof: Given a mistake [Target appears X → Target is Y], a guessing-error of
type [Guessed(categoryi ) = Y → categoryi is X] will account for this mistake in both
the Radio-Button and the Check-Box schemas; this establishes equality. However,
the CheckBox schema can introduce additional guessing-error explanations for many
mistakes.
We will formally describe one class of introduced guessing-errors: For a given
category Y , we will use TY to refer to the set of binary questions answered positively.
Consider TY −part = {t1 , t2 ...tm } to be any partitioning of TY into subsets. Note that
for each of these subsets tj there exists a category Xj such that TXj = tj . If possible
(if all categories Xj that are referenced in the partition are non-empty), choose an
arbitrary individual ij ∈ Xj for each Xj . Then the increased guess-error set includes

[ j (guessed(category(ij )) = Xj ) → ∀ij , category(ij ) isX∅ ], where X∅ is the category
such that TX∅ = 0. All combinations of individuals in all non-empty partitioning
schemes for T will introduce new possible guess-errors for this mistake.
We note with interest that our third privacy factor, sensitivity, behaves diﬀerently
in our model than in the diﬀerentially private analyses. Although the Check-Box
schema increases the sensitivity in comparison to the Radio-Button schema (by increasing the number of published values that one individual can contribute to), it also
increases the number of possible interpretations for any observed pattern in the data.
This eﬀect isn’t apparent in sensitivity costs, which are computed using worst-case
hypothetical data-sets and an implicit assumption that an attacker knows with certainty the values for n − 1 individuals. Diﬀerential privacy gives a robust, absolute
guarantee of individual privacy, but our De Facto model is able to capture a few
interesting properties that emerge in less extreme cases.
We now look at an ad hoc privacy measure that is often used in real world deterministic publication schemas: grouping together distinct attribute values into a
single joint value. For example, in the Check-Box schema from our Sex/Drugs survey
example, we might choose to instead group the two separate S, D counts into a single
Risk = S ∨ D count that would simply count the total number of students who fell
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into the group categorySex ∪ categoryDrugs ∪ categoryBoth . Intuitively this increases
the privacy of the students to some degree; we can observe this eﬀect formally in our
model.
Corollary 7.7 In a Radio-Button schema, grouping sets of categories (replacing a

set of categories {C1 , C2 , ...Cj } with one category CGroup = Ci ) will monotonically
increase the average probability of mistakes.

4

Proof: This is in fact the inverse operation of the splitting procedure (by inclusion
of additional binary questions) discussed in Theorem 7.5. Removing categories is
equivalent to removing binary-questions, thus this result follows from the previous
Theorem.
Corollary 7.8 A degree distribution with a cut-oﬀ and a published count of individuals falling above the cut-oﬀ, is an example of a Grouped Radio-Button schema.

Proof: If the raw data-set is the social network (the guess-set G consists of friendship lists for each individual in the network and a category is a speciﬁc set of friends),
the count for degree d in the the degree distribution is the count of a joint category
that groups together all friends-list categories of size d. A cut-oﬀ with a published
count is equivalent to grouping all individuals in the categories that fall above the
cut-oﬀ. Other network distributions we have discussed in previous chapters (such as
LCC distributions) will behave analogously. DeFacto privacy in these distributions
depends on the amount of data, the number of small count categories (which will produce low-probability mistakes), and number of histogram buckets (which determines
the number of binary questions asked).
We also note that results that pertain to Radio-Button schemas have implications
for Check-Box schemas as well:
4

Note that Grouping is distinct from a Check-Box Schema in that a Grouped Radio-Button schema
is still a partitioning of the data-set: no individual can contribute to more than one group.
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Corollary 7.9 Both Grouping and increasing the size of the data-set will increase
the average probability of mistakes in Check-Box schemas.

Proof: This follows from our previous results. Since both Grouping and increasing
the data-set size increase the base probability of mistakes in the foundational RadioButton schema (Corollary 7.7 and Corollary 7.4 respectively), and the Check-Box
schema preserves those increased probabilities in addition to adding new possible explanations to the guess-error sets (Theorem 7.6), Check-Box schema mistake probabilities will also be increased by these steps.
Finally, we will brieﬂy discuss the relationship between low-probability mistakes
and factors that have been observed to increase the likelihood of re-identiﬁcation
in real world data-sets. Looking at the mistake probabilities in the Radio-Button
schema (Theorem 7.3), we see that in a data-set of size n, a very low (but non-zero)
probability mistake [Target appears X → Target is Y] arises from two factors:
• The size of category Y is small (possibly even a singleton). This means that
individuals in this category are rare and may stand out in the data.
• The question set is large (k is large). This means that more information is
collected about each individual. This additional information may make it easier
to identify an individual in the data-set (even with less complete prior guesses
than we assume in De Facto privacy).
An individual i who is unique in the data-set and who has a large set of attributes
will introduce a set of very low probability mistakes [Target appears X → Target is
categoryi ]. A data-set with a large number of low-probability possible mistakes is a
concern for privacy.
Relevant to this, we note the following result with respect to k-anonymity:
Theorem 7.10 In the Radio-Button Schema, enforcing k-anonymity over all attributes of a data-set with q binary questions will result in a lower-bound of
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1
k(pcorrect )n−1 (.01)( 2q−1
) on mistake probability. However, only enforcing k-anonymity

over a subset of ’quasi-identifying’ attributes will not provide this lower-bound on mistake probability.

Proof: Following from Theorem 7.3, we know that the probability of a mistake
1
[Target appears X → Target is Y] is |categoryY | × (pcorrect )n−1 (.01)( 2k−1
). If all

categories have a minimum size of k, the result follows. However, if only a subset of
’quasi-identifying’ attributes are considered in the k-anonymity rule, then singleton
categories (split by attributes that are considered not to be quasi-identifying) are still
possible, and low-probability mistakes may exist.5

7.4

Practical Example
We will now brieﬂy illustrate the De Facto model’s interpretation of a real world

controversy over deterministic data publication.

Fig. 7.3.: Distribution of frequent GPS locations across all trips on 1/1/2013-1/2/2013

In Chapter 6, we referenced the New York City Taxi Data set [65]. This data
was collected in 2013, published in a simply-anonymized data-set in response to a
Freedom of Information Law request in 2014, and was de-anonymized very shortly
5
Recall that l-diversity ensures that there are several diﬀerent non-quasi-identifying attribute values
appearing in each quasi-identifying category; it does not ensure that every possible category of
individual (ie, considering all attributes) is well-populated.
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thereafter [66]. As a result of the de-anonymization, sensitive data such as the tipping
habits and evening destinations of celebrities became public knowledge. The data-set
included (among other data), for every cab driver, a log of all trips: trip origin and
destination (in GPS coordinates accurate to 1 meter), date, time, fare, number of
passengers, distance, and tips.
In late 2014, taxi competitor Uber oﬀered to release their own New York City
data-set, in what they felt was a more privacy-preserving format [67]. Their proposed
data-set would consist of a set of independent trips, including the time of the trip
and the origin and destination as zip codes. There would be no information on cab
driver which could be used to link trips.
In the original NYC taxi data-set there are over 20,000 unique drivers with an
average of approximately 20 trips per day. The distribution of locations (within 10m
precision) that were visited at least 30 times over January 1st and 2nd is given in
Figure 7.3; the vast majority of locations were visited less than 30 times.
Under the De Facto model, the NYC Taxi data set is a Radio-Button schema with
an incredibly large question set. Consider the number of categories present in one
day’s data: Assuming there are d distinct drivable GPS locations in NYC (within a
granularity of 1 meter), then there are d2 possible trips, and there are approximately
d40 possible series of 20 trips. Assuming cabs generally take 1-3 passengers, there
are d40 × 320 possible trip series with car-pooling information included. Adding miles
traveled (which depends on route), departure and arrival times, and tip amount, results in a data-set in which essentially every category is a singleton and k is extremely
large. We would expect this data-set to have a high-probability of de-anonymization.
Alternatively, with respect to the Taxi data, the Uber proposal introduced both
Grouping (by zip code, car-pool, and tip), and a Check-Box schema (in which a
cab driver’s trips were de-linked). This would signiﬁcantly decrease the number of
low-probability mistakes by decreasing the number of categories (and thus the total
number of mistakes), and increasing the probability of any given mistake (by increasing the set of guess-errors which could induce a given mistake). Unfortunately, Uber’s
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proposal was denied and Uber has been required by the New York City government
to submit a data-set in the same format as the 2013 Taxi data-set; the full Uber data
may now also be accessible by Freedom of Information Law requests [68].

7.5

Summary
The De Facto model provides a method for estimating the degree to which a

given data-set and publication schema magnify an attacker’s uncertainty about the
population, inhibiting his ability to use outside information to correct infer the true
value of a target individual; we demonstrated that, in the Radio-Button schema, a
very large and evenly distributed data-set with a very small question-set (small value
of k) requires the attacker to possess a potentially infeasible degree of certainty about
all of the individuals in the data-set in order to have a high probability of correctly
uncovering their target individual. We have additionally demonstrated that our De
Facto model provides a mathematical framework that captures the following intuitive
ideas about privacy in deterministic settings:
• Privacy increases as the data-set size increases (Theorems 7.4 and 7.9)
• Privacy decreases as the output space (and the amount of information collected
about each individual) increases (Theorem 7.5).
• Privacy increases as attribute precision is reduced. (Theorems 7.7 and 7.9)
• Privacy increases as records are de-linked. (Theorem 7.6)
• K-anonymity provides privacy protection, but the eﬀectiveness of this protection
is reduced if attributes are designated as not quasi-identifying. (Theorem 7.10)
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8. CONCLUSIONS
This work proposed to address the question: ”Is practically usable, privacy-preserving
social network analysis feasible?” We began by stating several properties that are
important for a privatization technique to be practically usable in real world contexts:
• Guaranteed Privacy: It must provide a well-deﬁned privacy guarantee to
individuals in the data-set.
• Maintain Utility: It must enable privatized analyses to produce results with
a reasonable level of accuracy.
• Practically Adoptable: To encourage adoption it must not impose a significant burden in computing power or mathematical expertise in comparison to
the non-privatized analysis it replaces.
We described existing work in simple anonymity, k-anonymity, diﬀerential edgeprivacy and node-privacy which did not concurrently achieve all three goals (Chapter
3). We then introduced two new adaptations of diﬀerential privacy to social network data: Contributor-Privacy (Deﬁnition 4.1), which protects the information each
individual contributes to the analysis, and Partition-Privacy (Deﬁnition 5.1), which
protects entire disjoint subgraphs.
These new adaptations of diﬀerential privacy enabled us to design privacypreserving social network techniques which provide robust guarantees of individual
privacy while producing high utility results. We demonstrated the ability of our privatized approach to easily and safely gather information for the following network
analyses:
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Privacy-preserving Social Network Analysis
• Local Clustering Coeﬃcients (with node-level information) [Section 4.4.1]
• Degree Distributions (with node-level information) [Section 4.4.1]
• Reciprocity [Section 4.4.2]
• Homophily [Section 4.2.3]
• Edge Properties [Section 4.2.3]
• Centrality/Community Structure [Section 4.2.4]
• Degree Distributions (with subgraph-level information) [Section 5.2.2]
• Local Clustering Coeﬃcients (with subgraph-level information) [Section 5.4.2]
• Average Shortest Path Length [Section 5.4.2]
• Edge Density [Section 5.4.2]
• Community Counts [Section 5.4.2]
Additionally, to ensure that privatized analysis provides the level of rigor required
for social science research (especially research that may be used to inform policy
decisions), we introduced a method of determining statistical signiﬁcance for paired
samples under diﬀerential privacy using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, which is
appropriate for non-normally distributed data such as social network analysis metrics.
(Chapter 6)
This work provides a signiﬁcant body of evidence to support the claim that our
original question can be answered aﬃrmatively: Practically usable, privacy-preserving
social network analysis is feasible, in many cases. This result is due both to our novel
adaptations of diﬀerential privacy to network data, and to our design of high-utility
privatized distributions for network analysis.
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In our ﬁnal contribution, we looked one step further to consider the mechanisms
that enable our privatized distributions to provide some level of privacy protection,
even before the addition of noise required to achieve diﬀerential privacy. We deﬁned
the De Facto privacy model for formally comparing the relative privacy of deterministic data publication schemas, and proved results related to two schemas, the RadioButton and Check-Box schemas. (Chapter 7) We demonstrated that our choice of
distributions for publishing social network data contributes signiﬁcantly to the privacy
protection oﬀered by our analyses (Theorem 7.8).
We hope that this foundational work will provide future social network analysts
with an array of possible options for easily, eﬀectively, and safely analyzing, sharing
and publishing sensitive social network data.
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